Albuquerque Long-Range Transit Security Plan

DECEMBER 2024

PREPARED BY:

Parametrix

ABQRIDE®

Albuquerque Long-Range Transit Security Plan

Contents

Contents (continued)

Contents (continued)

Contents (continued)

Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACS	Albuquerque Community Safety
AFR	Albuquerque Fire Rescue
APD	Albuquerque Police Department
APTA	American Public Transportation Association
ART	Albuquerque Rapid Transit
City	City of Albuquerque
CPTED	Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
CSA	Community Safety Ambassador
CT	criminal trespass
DT	defensive tactics
FTA	Federal Transit Administration
MCO	motor coach operator
MSD	Metro Security Division
NMRX	New Mexico Rail Runner
OC	oleoresin capsicum
PSAs	Police Service Aides
RBT	reality-based training
Security Plan 2023	Albuquerque Transit Security Plan 2023
TCRP	Transit Cooperative Research Program
TS	Transit Safety
TSO	Transit Safety Officer

Executive Summary

This report documents the analyses, findings, and recommendations of a study to develop and implement a long-term public transit safety strategy for the ABQ RIDE transit system. Transit system service providers and users encounter threats daily ranging from simple violations of the "Rules to Ride" to serious criminal activities including life-threatening situations involving physical assault and battery. Safety and security issues also involve vandalism of buses, bus shelters, and transit stations. Vandalism is a frequent occurrence that results in significant cost for repair, causes bus service delays, and dissuades people from using the transit system. Bus driver and maintenance personnel productivity is adversely affected because of incidents, and employees often leave ABQ RIDE due to the stress of ongoing incidents. The public perception of safety on ABQ RIDE has negatively affected ridership, especially for commuters and people who are dependent on transit to access work, school, medical services, and other daily needs.

In February 2023, the Albuquerque City Council adopted bill F/S (3) O-22-47 that requested ABQ RIDE prepare a study to address security affecting the transit system. The ordinance requested development of a short-term strategy that could be implemented quickly with existing police, security, and transit resources, and a long-range strategy that considered tactics, personnel, equipment, training, and other elements needed to establish a long-term public transit safety strategy.

The short-term strategy was completed in March 2023 by a cooperative effort involving the Albuquerque Police Department (APD), Metro Security Division (MSD), Albuquerque Community Safety (ACS), and ABQ RIDE. Several initiatives identified by the working group have been implemented over the last 18 months and have resulted in substantial improvements to transit safety and security. However, significant challenges remain that require resolution.

ABQ RIDE initiated the next step to meet the directive of F/S (3) O-22-47 by preparing this long-range security plan. The long-range plan includes the following information:

- An overview of the current ABQ RIDE system

- A description of the current approach used by the City of Albuquerque to provide transit safety and security including the actions provided by ABQ RIDE, APD, and MSD

- A review and analysis of the types, frequency, and locations where safety and security incidents occur that affect use of the transit system

- Interviews with ABQ RIDE motor coach operators, facility maintenance staff, security personnel, and the decision makers within each city department involved in transit safety and security to understand their perspectives and concerns

- Results of a public survey to obtain perspectives of transit users and others affected security incidents

- A literature review of best practices and what is being done by other transit providers to address transit safety and security

■ Potential security enforcement models, including their staffing and budget needs, and the policies, procedures, and internal changes necessary to implement a preferred transit safety and security program for ABQ RIDE.

A key element of the study was identifying the type of incidents that are occurring on buses and at transit facilities. Review of data maintained by APD, MSD, and ABQ RIDE, and input provided by bus drivers, facility maintenance personnel, security staff, and the public, identified numerous threats that frequently occur at or near stops, stations, and transit centers, and onboard buses. While the types of threats are reported under various categories, almost all are rooted in one or more of the following issues:

■ **Loitering and Suspicious Persons** — This category of incidents includes people gathering around a transit facility without the intent to use transit and is typically associated with use of transit facilities for shelter by those who are unhoused or for criminal activity associated with narcotics use and sale. This type of incident accounts for approximately 25% of incidents recorded by MSD and 34% of APD's data. While the act of loitering itself is a minor offense, it is generally tied to more serious offenses involving narcotics and/or possession of weapons.

■ **Wellness and Medical Incidents** — This incident type is listed frequently in the ABQ RIDE and MSD databases and accounts for 30% of all ABQ RIDE incidents and 21% of all MSD incidents. Wellness and medical incidents are rooted in factors such as homelessness, drug or alcohol abuse, and mental health.

■ **General Disturbances and Disorderly Conduct** — This category accounts for 10% of all ABQ RIDE incidents, 18% of incidents by MSD, and 9% of incidents recorded by APD and includes behavior such as harassment, aggressive gestures, abusive language, spitting at others, refusing to exit property, and additional actions that disturb others. These types of behavior disrupt drivers, are intimidating to transit users, and can escalate into more serious offenses.

■ **Drugs, Alcohol, and Narcotics** — While these specific categories were not among the highest levels reported among any group, they were reported consistently among all groups; 2% for ABQ RIDE, 9% for APD, and 10% for MSD. While APD data lists narcotics for 9% or their reports, information from APD senior staff suggests narcotics may be involved in **more than 40% of all incident types**. Narcotics and alcohol are common with the incident categories listed above. This incident category is a threat to transit drivers, transit users, facility maintenance personnel and the security providers themselves because of the volatility involved.

All the items listed above are a threat to drivers, maintenance staff, and security personnel and likely reduce the use of transit because of their negative influence on public perception of safety.

Considerable progress has been made by ABQ RIDE and APD over the last 18 months to address transit safety and security issues. Progress includes the implementation of the Transit Safety Officer (TSO) program operated by APD to patrol transit corridors and facilities, and the addition of Police Service Aides (PSAs) to ride buses. ABQ RIDE has implemented new programs and measures including an aggressive cleaning and maintenance program to improve the appearance of transit facilities and buses to deter loitering and vandalism. They also updated and broadly advertised new Rules to Ride and implemented a rider suspension policy for serious and/or repeat offenders. In addition, ABQ RIDE implemented a new mobile phone app (*See something, Say something*) that

allows the public to discretely report problems in real-time. These and other efforts by ABQ RIDE and APD have helped reduce security threats. Despite the progress made, numerous gaps in the current approach remain. Critical gaps include:

- The current approach involves three city departments but does not have a single point of management and accountability. This approach provides some benefit but also creates challenges, duplicates functions and staff, adds cost, and reduces efficiency. Program leadership is responsible for multiple programs and are not able to focus on the needs of the transit safety and security program

- Interdepartmental agreements are not in place that formally establish budget and staff resource allocation and roles and responsibilities. The lack of agreements and a unified management structure is further complicated by use of three distinct security forces, each with differing levels of authority and training.

- Each of the departments involved in transit safety and security maintain their own databases to record and analyze incidents. Reporting does not follow a uniform approach making it difficult to analyze data and determine trends.

- Each of the primary participants has their own dispatch system and protocols. This affects incident tracking, slows incident response time, and limits interdepartmental communication.

- Incident management and response times are typically not adequate to ensure transit personnel and transit users feel secure. This situation can lead to increased turnover of ABQ RIDE employees and reduced use of transit by the public.

After consideration of various enforcement models and discussions with APD, MSD, and ABQ RIDE, a preferred strategy was identified. Key features of the preferred strategy include joint leadership by ABQ RIDE and APD under a revised management structure and an increased number of security forces working under APD. This approach emphasizes the strengths of each agency with ABQ RIDE involvement in program management, administration, planning, and decision-making, and engages APD for their legal enforcement authority as well as their expertise in enforcement, tactical planning, and hiring and training of security professionals. MSD and ACS would participate in specific aspects of enforcement and monitoring activities but would not participate in program management and administration.

The proposed program would consist of 86.5 positions as shown in Exhibit ES-1. For comparison purposes, the current program consists of 83.5 positions, 45 of which are security guards working under contract to ABQ RIDE.

The estimated cost of the proposed program is approximately $7.3 million including labor, equipment, and vehicles. For comparison, the cost of the current program is approximately $6.3 million. The cost breakdown for labor is summarized in Exhibit ES-2. Positions that exist within ABQ RIDE and APD that would exist regardless of the transit safety and security program are not included in the budget calculations. These include the APD Deputy Commander, ABQ RIDE management and administrative costs, and other similar positions.

Exhibit ES-1. Recommended Positions and Quantities

Position	Department	Quantity
Deputy Commander	APD	1
Safety and Security Manager	ABQ RIDE	1
Transit Safety Sergeant	APD	6
Transit Safety Officer	APD	72
Community Safety Ambassador	ABQ RIDE	1
Sr. Security Trainer	ABQ RIDE	0.5
Dispatch	ABQ RIDE	4
Data Analyst	ABQ RIDE	1
	Total Positions:	86.5

Exhibit ES-2. Summary of Costs

Program	Staff Size	Personnel Costs	Equipment Costs	Total Cost
Recommended Program	86.5	$6,027,785	$1,237,911	$7,265,696
Current Program	83.5	$5,564,500	$601,205	$6,165,705
Difference	+3	$463,285	$636,706	$1,099,991

The cost for the recommended transit safety and security program is about $1.1 million more than currently expended. However, the added cost will help ABQ RIDE be more effective in providing transit service that is safe, secure, and equitable for its employees, transit users, and security personnel. Successful implementation will help rebuild trust with transit users and the public and will help increase ridership and enable transit staff to perform their duties without fear or threat of physical, mental, or emotional harm.

The transit safety and security program described in this plan provides a structure, staffing plan, and budget to implement a cost-effective approach to combat threats that affect transit workers and transit users. While the program cost is approximately $1.1 million more than currently being expended, more than half of the added costs are for capital and will not be recurring on an annual basis. The relatively small increase in cost dedicated for safety and security will help ABQ RIDE be more effective in providing transit service that is safe, secure, and equitable for its employees, transit users, and security personnel. In addition, improved security will reduce the cost of vandalism and cost associated with employee absence caused by job stress. Successful implementation will help rebuild trust with transit users and the public, will help increase ridership, and will enable transit staff to perform their duties without fear or threat of physical, mental, or emotional harm.

1. Introduction

1.1 Study Objectives and Purpose

This report documents the analyses, findings, and recommendations of a study to develop and implement a long-term public transit safety strategy for the ABQ RIDE transit system. Transit system service providers and users encounter threats daily, ranging from simple violations of the "Rules to Ride" to serious criminal activities, including life-threatening situations involving physical assault and battery. Safety and security issues also involve vandalism of buses, bus shelters, and transit stations. Vandalism is a frequent occurrence that results in significant cost for repair and causes bus service delays. Bus driver and maintenance personnel productivity is adversely affected as a result of incidents, and employees leave ABQ RIDE due to the stress of ongoing incidents with no real remedies available. Lastly, safety threats and the related public perception of safety on ABQ RIDE have negatively affected ridership, especially for commuters and people who are transit-dependent and rely on transit to access work, school, and their other daily needs.

Recognizing the importance of transit safety and costs to the public and the City of Albuquerque (City), the Albuquerque City Council requested a study to address security on the transit system. Enacted by F/S (3) O-22-47, the City Council requested a study to include transit vehicles, bus stops and stations, and regional transit centers. The City Council request included a short-term strategy that could be implemented quickly with existing police, security, and transit resources, as well as a long-range strategy that considered tactics, personnel, equipment, training, and other elements needed to establish a long-term public transit safety strategy. The short-term strategy was completed in March 2023 by a cooperative effort involving the Albuquerque Police Department (APD), Metro Security Division (MSD) of the General Services Department, Albuquerque Community Safety (ACS) Department, and the Albuquerque Transit Department. Recommendations from that study are included in the report titled *Albuquerque Transit Security Plan 2023* (*Security Plan 2023),* which resulted in the formation of a working group consisting of representatives from ABQ RIDE, APD, and MSD to discuss issues, needs, and tactics to improve security. Several initiatives identified by the working group have been implemented over the last 18 months and have resulted in improvements to transit safety (see discussion in Section 2.4.2).

The next step to meet the directive of F/S (3) O-22-47 is the development of a long-range security plan, the contents of which are discussed in this report. These include a summary of efforts undertaken to date to assess the current safety and security problems facing ABQ RIDE, the strategies and tactics identified and evaluated to improve safety for users of the transit system, enforcement model options considered by ABQ RIDE, and a proposed organizational and management structure and budget.

As used in this report, transit "safety" and "security" are synonymous and refer to actions to protect transit staff, security forces, users of the transit system, and others from threats by abusive, aggressive, and dangerous people. While all transit staff are considered, the security efforts are focused on frontline motor coach operators (MCOs) (bus drivers), maintenance staff responsible for the cleanliness and condition of stops, stations, and transit centers, and others involved in providing transit service. Security forces include unsworn and sworn security personnel, such as the private security guards used by ABQ RIDE, MSD Officers, APD Transit Safety Officers (TSOs) , Police Service Aides (PSAs), and sworn police officers. Threats associated with workplace safety, hazards, risk

management, and mishaps and accidents occurring on buses and at bus stops, stations, and transit centers are *not* addressed by this long-range plan. These issues are covered by the ABQ RIDE *Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan* filed with the Federal Transit Administration in late 2024.

The vision for ABQ RIDE and its partners responsible for safety and security is to provide comprehensive, efficient, and comfortable transit service that is safe, secure, and equitable for its employees, transit system users, and security personnel. Riders should be safe to use the transit system, and MCOs, facility maintenance personnel, and others responsible for providing transit services should be able to perform their duties without fear or threat of physical, mental, or emotional harm.

1.2   ABQ RIDE Existing System and Services

ABQ RIDE currently provides transit service in the City and certain areas in the unincorporated areas of Bernalillo County. After a two-year trial program, ABQ RIDE adopted a "Zero Fares" program and no longer charges to use fixed-route transit service. The system includes 23 fixed routes, with a total of 750 one-way miles (not including overlapping mileage on streets used by multiple routes) served by about 150 MCOs. Service is provided between the hours of about 5:30 a.m. and 11 p.m., though most service is between 6:30 a.m. and 10 p.m. The routes include 23 fixed routes and two bus rapid transit routes (known as the Albuquerque Rapid Transit [ART] system) spanning the west, downtown, and east sides of Albuquerque via Central Avenue and Louisiana Boulevard. In addition to the fixed-route services, ABQ RIDE also provides paratransit service (Sun Van) on a reservation basis and microtransit service that uses vans to connect riders in two zones of the City and enables them to access other parts of the City using other fixed routes. Sun Van includes an additional 58 drivers. Exhibit 1-1 shows the ABQ RIDE system map for fixed routes as of 2023. Some changes to service have been made in 2024 that may not be reflected in the current map.

The ABQ RIDE system includes five transit centers (see Exhibit 1-1), one of which primarily serves as a park-and-ride lot and transit center for the New Mexico Rail Runner (NMRX), a commuter rail service connecting the Albuquerque and Santa Fe regions. This center is located on Montaño Road between 2nd Street and Edith Boulevard adjacent to the NMRX line. Safety and security incidents

Source: ABQ RIDE web page

Exhibit 1-1. ABQ Ride System Map 2023

Source: ABQ RIDE

are infrequent at this location. In contrast, numerous incidents have been reported at the other four transit centers (see discussion in Section 3.1.3), including incidents on buses, at boarding platforms, and in parking lots. These centers include the Northwest Transit Center at Ellison Road and the Coors Bypass, Central/Unser Transit Center at Central Avenue and Unser Boulevard, Uptown Transit Center at Uptown Boulevard and Americas Parkway, and Alvarado Transit Center at Central Avenue and 1st Street in downtown Albuquerque. Except for the Alvarado Transit Center, each of the transit centers includes parking lots for park-and-ride service and passenger drop-off zones. The Alvarado Transit Center is the largest hub in the ABQ RIDE system, and it connects multiple routes and serves as the terminus for approximately 20 routes. It is also an intermodal facility that connects to the NMRX and is adjacent to AMTRAK and Greyhound bus terminals. The other three transit centers generally connect three or four routes that start and end at the transit center. While not an official transit center, the terminal end of ART Route 777 at Tramway Boulevard and Wenonah Avenue serves as a layover and transfer point and has a high rate of safety and security incidents.

Example of an acrylic panel to protect bus drivers

Stations and bus stops used by ABQ RIDE generally range from simple stops equipped with route signs, benches, and simple overhead shelters (some stops do not provide benches and/or shelters) to covered ART platforms equipped with security cameras, seating, real-time bus arrival information kiosks, and other modern equipment. Most ART stations are in the roadway median except for the segment of Central Avenue east of Louisiana Boulevard where the stations are located curbside.

Example of an ART transit platform

Representative example of an ABQ RIDE bus station

The fixed-route bus system is served by over 160 vehicles consisting of 40-foot low-floor buses fueled with compressed natural gas or hybrid buses and 60-foot diesel-fueled, low-floor articulated buses. Articulated buses are exclusive to ART routes and are equipped with doors on both sides of the bus to accommodate both median and curbside stops. Five electric buses were recently put into service on select routes. All buses are equipped with radios to communicate with the ABQ RIDE dispatch center and video cameras to observe the rear doors and back of the bus. Drivers are separated from passengers by transparent acrylic barriers.

A dispatch and communication center is located at the Alvarado Transit Center and operates daily, generally between 5 a.m. and midnight. Dispatch communicates with drivers and facility maintenance personnel via two-way radios and mobile phones. Radios are equipped with an emergency button tied to the dispatch center for use when a life-threatening situation is encountered. The dispatch center also has video monitors to observe field operations, but these are generally not used for incident detection. The center is staffed with five communication center specialists responsible for incident response, customer requests for Sun Van service, and general customer service.

Bus cleanliness and maintenance of bus stops, stations, and transit centers is provided by facility maintenance staff. This group provides general maintenance and repairs, including graffiti removal; painting; trash pickup and removal; shelter maintenance; and other similar activities needed to keep stops, stations, and centers clean, visually attractive, and in a state of good repair.

ABQ RIDE employs over 365 staff, including drivers, mechanics, maintenance, dispatch, training, administrative, and management personnel. Of this number, approximately 208 are drivers and 52 are maintenance staff.

2. Existing Transit Security Program

ABQ RIDE currently has an existing transit safety and security program in place that is a collaborative interdepartmental approach involving Albuquerque Police Department (APD), Metro Security Division (MSD), and ABQ RIDE contract security forces. The program has been in operation for many years but has recently undergone substantial transformation and updates following the implementation of *Security Plan 2023*, a short-range security plan. Details of the existing security program are described in the report titled *Security Plan 2023* and are therefore not repeated in full in this document. An overview of critical elements is provided below in Exhibit 2-1.

Safety and security for the ABQ RIDE transit system is provided by a joint effort involving multiple city departments and groups. Roles and responsibilities overlap between groups, and a single point of responsibility and accountability is not clearly defined. The general roles and actions for each group are summarized below.

Exhibit 2-1. Departments and Personnel Dedicated to Transit Security

Agency	Field Personnel	Authority	Force Assigned to Transit	Training
ABQ RIDE	Level 1 Contract Security Guards	Observe and report	~45 contracted security guards	24-hour training program
MSD	Security Officers	Observe, report, and detain	~8 security officers	160-hour training program
APD	Transit Safety (TS) Sergeants	Observe and report	~ 2 TS Sergeants	13 weeks plus required updates
	Transit Safety Officers (TSOs)	Observe and report	~19 TSOs (25 funded)	12 weeks + 1 week crisis intervention and required updates
	Police Service Aides (PSAs)	Observe and report	~12 PSAs	12 weeks + 1 week crisis intervention and required updates
	Sworn Officers	Detain, cite, or arrest	Sworn officers dispatched as needed	Law Enforcement Training Academy
Albuquerque Community Services (ACS)	Social and Community Health Professionals	Non-law enforcement response	~60 positions	Various training in safety, crisis intervention, and first aid, among others

2.1 ABQ RIDE Safety and Security Roles, Responsibilities, and Activities

ABQ RIDE has implemented several tactics and programs to provide safety and security for its employees and transit system users. These efforts include adoption of various rules and procedures directed at safety, training provided to drivers and maintenance staff, a dispatch system to report and respond to incidents and threats, and use of a contracted security force (currently Guarda World).

2.1.1   Rules and Procedures

The primary rules and procedures directed at safety and security include ABQ RIDE's passenger code of conduct (Rules to Ride), dispatch, training, and contract security as summarized below. In addition, ABQ RIDE strives to proactively engage with the public and maintain buses and facilities in clean condition and state of good repair as a deterrent to conditions that can attract individuals and groups who use the transit system inappropriately.

Passenger Code of Conduct — ABQ RIDE updated their Rules to Ride in 2024 and prominently displays the rules on all buses and at stops, stations, and transit centers. The rules are specific to passenger conduct, prohibited activities, banned substances and items, excessive riding, and other associated issues. Exhibit 2-2 shows the sign used to announce the Rules to Ride and lists the specific rules.

In October 2024, ABQ RIDE adopted new guidelines and procedures for managing people who violate the Rules to Ride or are otherwise disruptive. The procedures include specific steps to be followed by motor coach operators (MCOs) on when and how to remove disruptive passengers and how MSD and/or APD are engaged for support. The guidance established three categories of offenses, two of which involve passenger removal, and the third focuses on prohibiting a person from boarding a bus. The procedures include three levels of offenses that prescribe the length of time a passenger may be suspended from using ABQ RIDE services, ranging from a minimum of seven days to a year or more.

Suspending transit users typically involves APD issuing a use of a criminal trespass (CT) citation. The CT citation and a photograph of the offender are provided to ABQ RIDE and MSD dispatch groups. Dispatch can query a database to determine whether a CT citation has been issued to an individual involved in a new incident call and inform the responding team of the past citation.

Exhibit 2-2. Sign Used by ABQ RIDE to Inform the Public of Rules to Ride

Dispatch — As discussed in Section 1.2, ABQ RIDE has an internal dispatch group for responding to security incidents and other transit matters. Specific procedures are in place that prescribe the responsibility for when and how drivers and other transit personnel are to report and respond to certain situations. These include the following:

- Notification requirements when drivers are involved in an accident or an incident that requires passenger removal, observes use or possession of illegal drugs, or observes excessive litter or clutter at a bus stop or station.

- ABQ RIDE operations radio-use instructions for emergency calls, priority calls, or other non-emergency calls. Emergency calls are when a driver encounters a life-threatening situation. Priority calls are to report crashes, serious mechanical problems, or serious incidents that are not life-threatening.

- Procedures for dispatch that specify who and in what order dispatch is to reach out to supervisors, MSD, or APD.

Training — ABQ RIDE has an internal training program for bus and transit van drivers that includes training for specific bus types, radio use, addressing harassment, de-escalation techniques, managing fatigue, removing passengers, preventing persons from boarding the bus, and procedures for accident and incident response.

ABQ RIDE Contract Security — ABQ RIDE contracts with a private security firm (currently GardaWorld) to provide approximately 45 uniformed security guards. The security guards meet state requirements for licensing/certification for Level 1 Security Guards and are required to receive 24 hours of training in observation and reporting.

Contract security personnel are deployed seven days per week and patrol ART platforms, bus stops, and transit centers, and they randomly ride buses on select routes. Shifts vary and can start in the early morning and extend until midnight, depending on the route being observed. Most patrol efforts are focused on Central Avenue, which include both ART routes and local bus routes, including the downtown area and Uptown Transit Center, though several other routes with a history of frequent security incidents are also patrolled including routes operating on Coors Boulevard, Lomas Boulevard, Menaul Boulevard, Montgomery Boulevard, San Mateo Boulevard, 4th Street, and other routes as needed. They also patrol the two ABQ RIDE garages and maintenance facilities.

Contracted security guard uniform

Security guards are not equipped with protective gear such as oleoresin capsicum (OC) spray (i.e., pepper spray), protective vests, batons, radios, and other gear typically used by security forces. They are identified by uniforms consisting of dark pants and white shirts with a security emblem on the sleeves. Security guards are trained in de-escalation and nonviolent intervention techniques and confront people

being disruptive or offensive or otherwise behaving inappropriately but are not trained in or allowed to use force. Their primary responsibility is to observe and report, enforce the Rules to Ride and Passenger Code of Conduct, and enforce other state statutes and local ordinances specific to smoking, alcohol use, drug use, and trespass. Security guards maintain a daily log to document the routine and non-routine events encountered during their shift.

When assistance is needed, the security guards communicate to drivers, who then contact ABQ RIDE dispatch to request support from APD or MSD. Requests for emergency support are made via 911. Security guards interface with ABQ RIDE drivers and maintenance personnel during stops and while riding buses. Daily and weekly tactical plans are developed in collaboration with APD, MSD, and ABQ RIDE during weekly coordination meetings.

2.2 Metro Security Division Security Roles, Responsibilities, and Activities

The Albuquerque MSD of the Albuquerque General Servies Department is an internal security force operated by the City of Albuquerque that provides security services for various city facilities, including transit. Their role in providing security for transit has varied and has been reduced over the last two years with the introduction of TSOs by APD. They currently focus on patrolling the Alvarado Transit Center and the ART route. Mobile field units and Central Avenue mobile patrols respond to calls from ABQ RIDE dispatch but are usually not involved in other parts of the transit system.

Overall, MSD employs over 100 security personnel. MSD security officers patrol all city facilities. Of these, approximately eight security officers are assigned to transit security, though they can be dispatched for additional support if needed. Their force includes security officers, security sergeants, supervisors, and security lieutenants. They patrol on foot and in mobile units.

Security personnel are equipped with "less than lethal" gear including collapsible batons, OC spray, handcuffs, vests, batons, radios, and badges. They are identified by uniforms consisting of gray pants and black shirts with a security emblem on their shirt front. Guards are trained in defensive tactics, incident management, de-escalation and nonviolent intervention techniques; OC, baton, and handcuff use; and other security and management elements. Security personnel can detain subjects until a sworn officer responds, but they do not have the authority to cite or arrest. Their training includes a 4-week, 160-hour training program.

MSD uniform

MSD security personnel respond to calls for support, but most of their efforts are proactive and self-initiated when they encounter problem individuals and situations during their patrols of transit centers and station areas. Typically, encounters that elicit actions involve intoxication, loitering, illegal drug use, mental health issues, and wellness checks. Calls for support from ABQ RIDE or other entities, such as

ACS or Albuquerque Fire Rescue (AFR), are managed by the closest available mobile patrol unit. Communication occurs via two-way radio.

Many of the calls for support from ABQ RIDE are to remove disruptive passengers from buses or to assist maintenance personnel at stops and stations. Calls for this support involve multiple steps, starting with drivers contacting ABQ RIDE dispatch, who contact a Transit Supervisor. The Transit Supervisor must then ask ABQ RIDE dispatch to contact MSD Communications (dispatch), who then dispatches the nearest MSD mobile patrol unit. MSD personnel will not engage violent offenders or individuals known to have a weapon. Rather they focus on protecting passengers and drivers without escalating the situation and contact APD for support.

2.3 Albuquerque Police Department Roles, Responsibilities, and Activities

APD provides both security personnel and sworn officer enforcement support to ABQ RIDE. In late 2023, APD and ABQ RIDE implemented a new program consisting of TS Sergeants, TSOs, and PSAs to help enforce ABQ RIDE's Rules to Ride and other City ordinances. These positions are non-sworn personnel focused on transit security under APD authority. The TSO program is still developing and is not yet fully staffed but is currently budgeted for 25 positions, including TS Sergeants, TSOs, and PSAs, to provide management and supervision. Currently, there are approximately 2 TS Sergeants and 19 TSOs employed. The number of PSAs assigned to transit varies and currently includes about 12 personnel. TSO and PSA patrols are currently focused on Central Avenue and the segment of Route 766 that extends north into Uptown.

TSOs are equipped with protective vests, OC spray, radios, body cameras, and badges. The uniform consists of a blue shirt, dark pants, a protective vest, a duty belt, and a badge worn on the vest front. A formal training program for TSOs is under development. In the interim, TSO candidates are trained using the PSA training program. This includes training in defensive tactics, incident management, de-escalation and nonviolent intervention techniques, and other security and management elements. TSOs do not have authority to cite or arrest offenders.

TSO uniform

The tactics and geographic coverage by TSOs are still fluid and being refined as the program grows. The current approach utilizes mobile patrols focused on bus stops and stations in the Central Avenue corridor and at the Central/Unser Transit Center, Alvarado Transit Center, and Uptown Transit Center. TSOs are not currently providing on-bus patrols and do not use buses to rove the bus system. Buses are patrolled by PSAs but are currently limited to bus routes on Central Avenue. When fully staffed, TSO and PSA coverage may extend to other parts of the bus system, including some on-bus patrols.

Like the tactics used by MSD, TSOs respond to calls from ABQ RIDE for support, but most of their efforts are proactive engagements as they encounter problem individuals and situations during their patrols. Calls for support from ABQ RIDE are referred to the closest available TSO mobile patrol unit, identifiable by sergeants with tracking technology. Communication is via two-way radio channeled through APD dispatch, but they have some ability to talk directly with ABQ RIDE dispatch.

In addition to providing support for TSOs and PSAs, APD provides support by sworn police officers when dispatched and during their routine patrols. Calls for requests from ABQ RIDE or TSOs and the resulting response time are prioritized based on the situation. Highest priority is given to life-threatening situations with a high possibility of death or serious injury. APD enters these calls and dispatches an officer immediately. Priority 2 calls involve crimes in progress that may result in injury or major loss of property. These calls are entered into the 911 system within one minute and dispatched within three minutes. Other calls (Priorities 3, 4, and 5) involving minor incidents without threat of personal injury are entered into 911 within two minutes, but dispatch times may range from 30 minutes to three hours. Lower-priority calls (Priorities 3, 4, and 5) received from ABQ RIDE are typically handled by TSOs.

2.4 Other Agencies and Activities Related to Transit Security

2.4.1 Other Agency Involvement

Transit security and safety can involve two other groups, including ACS and AFR. ACS does not work directly with ABQ RIDE but is called by APD or AFR when they encounter non-criminal and nonviolent situations that do not require enforcement. ACS personnel include approximately 60 social workers and behavioral health specialists who focus on persons who are homeless, have addiction issues, or have mental health issues. They recently co-located an office at the Alvarado Transit Center, with the intent of proactively engaging people at the Alvarado Transit Center who may have mental and/or behavioral health needs, homelessness, addiction, or other social needs. ACS is also charged with bus stop and station visits to proactively reach out to individuals in need of support.

AFR is not involved with transit security and safety, but they do respond to calls involving medical emergencies; hazardous substances; and fires at bus stops, stations, and transit centers. On-bus medical emergencies are also handled by AFR.

2.4.2 Other Security-Related Activities

ABQ RIDE has been progressive in efforts to develop and implement new policies and programs to improve safety on the transit system. While much of their efforts have focused on the use of enforcement personnel, including contract security guards, municipal security personnel, and ACS teams, several new preventative and nonenforcement programs have been implemented over the last 18 months. These include the following:

- Equipping buses with security barriers to protect drivers from aggressive passengers, onboard cameras to monitor bus entry and activity, and procedures to request support discreetly.

- Installation of smoke detectors on buses to detect the use of illegal and barred substances.

- Cameras at ART stations and transit centers to monitor activities in these areas.

- An aggressive maintenance and cleaning program to keep buses, stops, stations, and transit centers clean and visually attractive. ABQ RIDE follows the premise that a clean appearance and well-maintained system can help discourage activities that degrade the system and attract loitering and criminal behavior. Efforts include trash and debris removal, use of epoxy flooring at ART stations, regular power washing of platforms and equipment, painting of transit stops and stations, maintaining lights, and other similar activities. ABQ RIDE also works with APD and the Solid Waste Department to remove encampments near bus routes and transit stops to help prevent activities that contribute to criminal behavior.

- Updating the Rules to Ride and rider suspension policy, including an aggressive marketing campaign to increase awareness of the updated and new rules.

- A new mobile phone app that allows the public to discretely report problems in real time. The *See something, Say something* app allows the public to connect with ABQ RIDE teams and submit photos and videos of suspicious activity, inappropriate behavior, safety threats, and other issues of concern.

3. Existing Security Conditions and Challenges

The development of a long-range security plan requires a thorough understanding of the incidents encountered by transit employees, transit users, and security personnel, as well as program challenges facing the administration and management. With this objective in mind, the type, frequency, and magnitude of threats encountered by ABQ RIDE and security providers were identified and quantified using three sources of information. The first source involved review and analysis of data collected by the departments currently providing security (i.e., ABQ RIDE, Albuquerque Police Department (APD), Metro Security Division (MSD), and Albuquerque Community Safety (ACS). The second source involved interviews with transit drivers, facility maintenance personnel, and ABQ RIDE contract security to assemble anecdotal information on the type and frequency of security threats they encounter. The third and final source of information was the public perception of current transit security conditions. This was accomplished using online survey/questionnaire forms. The methodologies used and findings for each data source are discussed in the following sections.

3.1 Data Review and Analysis Approach

Data analysis was an important step in better understanding the transit security issues the City of Albuquerque (City) is currently facing. It is critical to identify not only the types of incidents occurring but also where they are occurring and their frequency. This information can be used in the development of security personnel deployment plans. Additionally, data analysis provided a supplement to anecdotal evidence received from transit employees, transit users, and security personnel. Identifying trends in incident data helps corroborate individual accounts of issues faced on transit.

Data was obtained from a variety of local agencies, including ABQ RIDE, APD, MSD, and ACS. Though the specifics of each dataset varied between agencies, all the datasets included basic information, such as the date, type of incident (e.g., assault, vandalism), and location (including coordinates, addresses, or cross streets). Depending on the breadth of the dataset, incident types were refined to include only those related to safety (or the perception of safety) on the transit system.

Because the data received was collected by four different agencies with differing data collection categories, the information available for review was variable. Distinct differences were found between the datasets. For example, ABQ RIDE data is specific to incidents onboard buses and at bus stops, stations, and transit centers. Similarly, MSD data included safety and security incidents on buses and at bus stops, stations, and transit centers but also included data for other city facilities and city property, such as parks, maintenance yards, etc. In contrast, APD and ACS data included information for all calls responded to by these departments, many of which did not involve transit. There were also differences in how data was reported, geographic references, and incident details. Because of a lack of consistency between datasets, each set was reviewed and analyzed individually and information relevant to transit was extracted. The approach taken with each dataset is discussed below.

3.1.1 ABQ RIDE

The ABQ RIDE database lists all transit-related incidents occurring between January 2023 and July 2024. Data collected by ABQ RIDE included the day of the week of the incident, the time of the incident, the bus route the incident occurred on, the location of the incident, the call type, and a brief description of the incident. While locations are provided in the data, they are limited to a description (e.g., cross streets, address, or building description); no location coordinates were available. The data included incidents that occurred on all ABQ RIDE routes in service over the data reporting period.

The data received from ABQ RIDE totaled approximately 1,340 incidents. To refine the data to be more representative of this study, incidents unlikely to be associated with transit security or safety threats were excluded. Incidents removed included occurrences such as vehicular crashes, mechanical issues, passenger falls, broken windshields, and other similar events. After filtering the dataset, approximately 630 incidents (47%) potentially specific to security threats remained. Once refined, the dataset was reviewed to identify trends, including the types of incidents encountered; their frequency; the time of day, week, and month; and the routes most affected. Major trends from the analysis are discussed below.

It is worth noting that the number of **incidents recorded in the ABQ RIDE database and discussed below under-represents the number of incidents encountered by drivers and maintenance personnel**. As discussed later in this section, drivers encounter safety and security threats multiple times each day. Incidents that result in support from APD or MSD are reflected in the databases maintained by these two agencies and are usually not included in the ABQ RIDE database; otherwise, the number of incidents would be duplicated. Drivers typically report only those incidents that affect their schedule or require bus repair. Making the reporting process easier may result in a more accurate and complete dataset that can be utilized for data-driven security planning.

3.1.1.1 Incidents by Routes

Review of the data identified eight routes with the greatest number of incidents. While incidents occur on all routes, the number of incidents on some routes is very low. Routes with the highest number of incidents include:

- Routes 766 and 777 (ART routes on Central Avenue).
- Route 66 (local bus route on Central Avenue).
- Routes 140 and 141 (San Mateo Boulevard).
- Route 11 (Lomas Boulevard).
- Route 5 (Montgomery Boulevard).
- Route 157 (Montaño Road).
- Route 155 (Coors Boulevard).
- Route 8 (Menaul Boulevard).

Of the above routes, most of the recorded incidents occurred on the local bus and ART bus routes operating on Central Avenue. Of the 630 incidents related to transit security, approximately 287

(46%) occurred on Routes 766, 777, and 66, all of which operate on Central Avenue. There were 195 incidents that occurred on the other routes, as summarized below:

- San Mateo Boulevard (Routes 140 and 141) — 35 incidents

- Lomas Boulevard (Route 11) — 45 incidents

- Montgomery Boulevard (Route 5) — 36 incidents

- Montaño Road (Route 157) — 33 incidents

- Coors Boulevard (Route 155) — 34 incidents

- Menaul Boulevard (Route 8) — 12 incidents

The remaining 148 incidents either occurred on other bus routes or had no identification route associated with them. Exhibit 3-1 is a heat map that illustrates the relative number of incidents on the ABQ RIDE transit system.

Exhibit 3-1. ABQ RIDE Incidents

As shown in this exhibit, the routes and subareas with the greatest number of incidents are as follows:

- Central Avenue from Unser Boulevard to Coors Boulevard, from San Mateo Boulevard to Wyoming Boulevard, and from Juan Tabo Boulevard to Tramway Boulevard.

- San Mateo Boulevard between Indian School Road south to Zuni Road.

- Montgomery Boulevard between Carlisle Boulevard and San Mateo Boulevard.

- Coors Boulevard from Alameda Boulevard and Paseo del Norte at the north end and Central Avenue south to Rio Bravo Road.

- The downtown area between Broadway Boulevard and 10th Street.

3.1.1.2 Incidents by Type

The types of incidents reported were also investigated. Of the 630 incidents related to transit security, approximately 91% involved six primary categories: wellness/medical/injury (~30%), vandalism (~25%), occurrence (~13%), disorderly conduct, (~10%), fight (~7%), and assault/battery (~6%). The top ten categories and percentage for each are shown in Exhibit 3-2. A description of each incident category is provided below.

Exhibit 3-2. ABQ RIDE Incidents by Type

Incident Types, All Routes (2023-24)
- Wellness/Medical 30%
- Vandalism 25%
- Occurrence 13%
- Disorderly Conduct 10%
- Fight 7%
- Assault/Battery 6%
- Altered Mental Status 3%
- Driver Action 2%
- Other 2%
- Drugs/Alcohol 2%

Wellness/Medical/Injury — This category accounted for 191 of the 630 incidents reported. These incidents involve a health event for passengers or drivers and include things such as seizures; heart attacks; overdoses; injuries from bus infrastructure (e.g., a ramp falling or passengers jumping off the moving bus); and injuries from needles, falls, or other events. While not all of these incident types are related to transit security, they were included because of their relationship to other security issues, such as drug use, intoxication, or mental health. Medical hazards can include instances such as drug-induced medical episodes; disruptive behavior potentially causing passengers to fall; or safety hazards to employees, such as discarded needles or glass.

Vandalism — Vandalism accounted for 158 incidents, approximately 25% of all potential security-related incidents. Vandalism involves the deliberate destruction or damage of property owned and/or maintained by ABQ RIDE. This includes all reported incidents of vandalism, many of which involved passengers intentionally breaking windshields, doors, and windows on buses, all of which could be reduced by increased security measures.

Occurrence — Occurrences accounted for 82 of the 630 incidents reported. Occurrences are a broad catch-all category for incidents without injury or intentional damage to facilities, equipment, or infrastructure. Examples of occurrences include passengers reporting to drivers that the bus was being shot at, passengers alerting the driver that they were threatened by another passenger, finding

damage to buses that could have been vandalism or accidental, and other incidents that do not fit other categories.

Disorderly Conduct — Disorderly conduct accounted for 63 of the 630 reported incidents. Disorderly conduct is a public disturbance that includes conduct, gestures, displays, or abusive language that could provoke violence. This could include refusing to leave the bus or bus stop, obstructing egresses, interfering with drivers and maintenance workers, or disrupting the peace of other passengers. Disorderly conduct does not include physical violence. Examples of disorderly conduct include passengers arguing with the driver, passengers refusing to deboard, passengers verbally harassing or threatening other passengers, and passengers inflicting harm on themselves.

Fight — Fights were reported in 44 of the incidents reviewed. A fight includes an aggressive physical interaction (such as hitting, shoving, and kicking) between passengers or between passengers and security guards. Fights can escalate to a level requiring transportation for medical reasons.

Assault/Battery — Assault/battery accounted for 38 incidents, approximately 6% of all potential security-related incidents. Assault and battery includes harmful or offensive contact to a transit employee or their belongings by a passenger or person. This includes actions such as fist fights or the use of objects, weapons, or projectiles. Nonphysical assault includes verbal threats, harassments, or intimidating comments.

3.1.1.3   Incidents by Time and Day of Week

Exhibit 3-3 illustrates the number of incidents by time of day. Most incidents occur between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. Most incidents occur on weekdays, with the highest number of incidents occurring on Wednesdays and Thursdays, with a peak time of around 2 p.m. The number of incidents prior to 9 a.m. and after 5 p.m. and on weekends is lower than other times of day.

Exhibit 3-3. ABQ RIDE Incidents by Time of Day

3.1.2   Albuquerque Police Department

The APD database consists of data for all calls responded to by APD officers between January 2022 and April 2024. A "call" could be a dispatch call or a self-initiated stop by an officer who observes a

field situation that may require police engagement. In contrast with ABQ RIDE data that included all 23 routes, the review of APD data was limited to five transit corridors identified as experiencing elevated levels of security and safety incidents, including Central Avenue, Coors Boulevard, San Mateo Boulevard, Montgomery Boulevard, and Wyoming Boulevard. Because the fields included in the APD database do not specify whether the incident was related to transit, their database was buffered using ArcGIS tools to include only incidents within 75 feet of the roadway centerline for each of the five priority corridors. Screening the data in this way still does not verify a transit relationship; however, it does focus the data on calls that are specific to a transit route. As discussed previously, activities and incidents a transit rider might encounter while traveling while walking or biking to or from a bus stop can influence their perception of safety using transit and their willingness to use transit.

The data fields included in the APD files pertinent to transit security include the incident type, incident location (such as coordinates, cross streets, or addresses), incident date, and outcome of the call (no officer dispatched, noncriminal police contact, arrest, report written, etc.). The database included approximately 40,000 incidents within the five targeted transit corridors. However, among these 40,000 reports, most were minor events as listed below that did not lead to a filed report or an arrest:

- False alarms.

- Noncriminal police contacts.

- Gone on arrival.

- Officer canceled.

- Be on the lookout.

The events that did not require filing a report accounted for approximately 90% of all incidents, which included approximately 36,000 of the 40,000 files reviewed. Of the approximately 4,000 remaining incidents, 1,560 resulted in an arrest. The 4,000 incidents were analyzed to identify potential trends for the types of incidents occurring along transit routes, their severity, and their location, as discussed below.

3.1.2.1   Incidents by Routes

Most of the incidents reviewed occurred along Central Avenue corresponding with Routes 66, 766, and 777. Collectively, the other four corridors account for approximately one-quarter of all incidents occurring along the five routes of interest. The breakdown of incidents for each route are shown in Exhibit 3-4.

Exhibit 3-4. Number and Percentage of Incidents by Route

Corridor	Corresponding Transit Routes	Number of Incidents	Percentage of Total
Central Avenue	Routes 66, 766, and 777	2,866	72%
Coors Boulevard	Route 155	380	9%
San Mateo Boulevard	Route 141	320	8%
Wyoming Boulevard	Route 31	233	6%
Montgomery Boulevard	Route 5	205	5%

The locations of incidents within each route were assessed to identify potential concentrations of incidents (hot spots). Incident locations were plotted using the geospatial coordinates included in the APD database as shown in Exhibit 3-5.

Exhibit 3-5. APD Incident Data Density Along Corridors

The location analysis identified several locations with a high concentration of incidents. The hot-spot locations by corridor are summarized below:

- **Central Avenue** — Four subareas within the Central Avenue corridor show high concentrations of incidents. The highest concentration occurs in the downtown area between Broadway Boulevard and 8th Street. This is followed by the area around the intersection of Central Avenue and Coors Boulevard, the segment of Central between San Mateo Boulevard and Wyoming Boulevard, and the area surrounding Central Avenue and Tramway Boulevard.

- **Coors Boulevard** — Incident densities along Coors Boulevard are moderate, with the greatest concentrations around the intersection with Central Avenue, between Iliff Road north to St. Joseph's Drive, at the intersection at Montaño Road, and at the northern end near the Cottonwood Mall area.

- **Montgomery Boulevard** — High concentrations of incidents along Montgomery Boulevard occur in the areas surrounding the intersections of Montgomery Boulevard with San Mateo Boulevard and Wyoming Boulevard. While the density varies in this segment, the entire segment from Carlisle Boulevard to Wyoming Boulevard is high.

- **San Mateo Boulevard** — Incidents peak along this route in the area between Zuni Road north to Lomas Boulevard and from I-40 north to Montgomery Boulevard.

- **Wyoming Boulevard** — Incident density along Wyoming Boulevard is highest just north of its intersection with Central Avenue and its intersection with Montgomery Boulevard.

A comparison of the heat maps prepared using APD data and ABQ RIDE data show similar trends as shown in Exhibit 3-6. This suggests that higher crime areas also have a greater number of incidents reported by ABQ RIDE on buses and at bus stops, stations, and transit centers. One notable difference between the datasets is found in the Albuquerque downtown area. The ABQ RIDE data does not include incidents at the Alvarado Transit Center since these are encompassed by APD data. As discussed later in this report, the Alvarado Transit Center has a very high incident rate. If the incidents at Alvarado Transit Center were incorporated into the ABQ dataset, it would show a pattern similar to the APD data.

Exhibit 3-6. Comparison of Hot Spots for APD Incident Data (left side) and ABQ RIDE Data (right side)

3.1.2.2   Incidents by Type

The types of incidents reported by APD were classified into eight primary categories. The top eight categories of APD incident calls and the percentage for each are shown in Exhibit 3-7 and Exhibit 3-8, and a description of each incident category is provided below. **Note that the number of incident calls by APD that involve narcotics is likely much higher than the 9% indicated.** Many of the calls involving a suspicious person or car or a wanted person are narcotics related. Thus, the actual percentage of APD calls related to narcotics may be several times more than shown. **Information from senior ranks at APD suggest that narcotics may involve more than 40% of all incident types.**

Suspicious Person/Vehicle — These incidents involve a person engaging in suspicious behavior or activity. These incidents can be called in or directly initiated by officers in the field. Suspicious

behavior can vary, and not all incidents involve criminal activity. These incidents may include individuals loitering in an area or performing activities that may alarm the public. An important note about these incidents is that they can involve incidents that would otherwise be classified in another category but were initially called suspicious behavior and classified as such. Discussions with APD members indicate that a substantial portion of these calls involve narcotics and other drug-related incidents. These calls accounted for 1,355 of the 4,000 incidents included in the analysis.

Exhibit 3-7. APD Incident Types and Frequency of Occurrence

Incident Type	Number of Incidents	Percentage of Total
Suspicious Person or Vehicle	1,355	34%
Assault, Battery, or Fight	701	18%
Wanted Person	678	17%
Disturbance	368	9%
Narcotics 1	353	9%
Other	280	7%
Vandalism	179	4%
Robbery/Theft	90	2%

1 Data is limited to incidents specific to narcotics. It is likely that narcotics may be involved in incidents listed under suspicious person or wanted person.

Exhibit 3-8. APD Incident Types and Frequency of Occurrence

Assault/Battery/Fights — Aggravated assault/battery occurs when bodily harm is inflicted on a victim. It may or may not involve weapons. In the context of transit security, this category includes passengers assaulting bus operators, other passengers, or prospective passengers waiting at or around the transit route. While not all these incidents occurred on transit, the severity and violent nature of the incidents affect perceptions of safety along the entire route. This call type accounted for over 701 incidents in the database.

Wanted Person — These incidents involve a person wanted by the police and can include an individual carrying a weapon, fleeing from a crime, or otherwise engaging in concerning behaviors. Wanted-person calls accounted for 678 of the 4,000 incidents included in analysis.

Disturbance — A disturbance may include a range of disorderly behavior but typically involves offensive conduct, gestures, or language that may result in physical violence. This could include refusing to leave property, obstructing or harassing citizens attempting to enter or exit locations, interfering with general operations of daily activities, verbally harassing or threatening other passengers, and other similar actions. Disturbances on and around transit contribute to an unsafe atmosphere and potential for escalating violence. Disturbances accounted for about 368 of the reported incidents.

Narcotics — These incidents involve the use or sale of drugs, especially those derived from opium, including heroin. This category primarily deals with the use and sale of drugs on board transit or at stops, though drug use may lead to further incidents, including physical violence. Based on other information, narcotics are a significant concern on board buses and along transit routes. Narcotics incidents accounted for about 353 incidents in the APD database. As noted above, narcotics are thought to pertain to 40% or more of all incidents, as they are often tied to incidents initially dispatched for suspicious persons or vehicles and wanted persons.

Other — The other category is a catch-all for security incidents that do not fall under the other predominant categories. This may include calls about unsheltered individuals, gunshots fired, sexual harassment or abuse, bomb squad activities, or missing persons. While a substantial number of overall incidents, the "other" category are spread across multiple types of calls, none of these individual calls accounted for over 2% of all incidents. Other incidents accounted for about 280 incidents, 7% of all incidents included in analysis.

Vandalism — These incidents involve deliberate destruction or damage of property. This includes all incidents of vandalism, including graffiti, intentional property damage, and sign vandalization, among others. Vandalism incidents accounted for 179 incidents, approximately 4% of all potential security-related incidents.

Robbery/Theft — These include incidents of individuals stealing items from adjacent properties or individuals. These account for approximately 90 incidents, about 2% of all incidents.

3.1.3   Metro Security Division

MSD provided data for their communication logs between July of 2021 to June of 2022. This period includes the time when MSD was the primary respondent to ABQ RIDE. Their involvement beyond 2022 has been reduced. Data was reviewed for the same five corridors evaluated using the APD data, including Central Avenue, Coors Boulevard, Montgomery Boulevard, San Mateo Boulevard, and Wyoming Boulevard. Like APD data, all documented incidents within 75 feet of the roadway centerline for each of these corridors were included. Data provided by MSD included the call classification, incident location (cross streets or addresses only; coordinates were not provided), incident date, and call type (transit facility, city facility, bus stop, etc.).

The one year of data evaluated included a total of 15,755 incidents logged across the five corridors of interest. Further analysis of these incidents revealed that of the 15,755 logged incidents, 5,428 (34%) occurred on a bus or at a bus stop, station, or transit center. The logs also include security checks that include patrolling updates, shift changes, and general patrols—items not pertinent to transit security. Removing the security check items left approximately 3,425 incidents involving transit security and safety. These 3,425 were analyzed to identify trends among the type of incidents occurring along transit routes and their locations. The general trends from this data analysis are discussed below.

3.1.3.1　Incident Locations

Of the 3,425 MSD-reported incidents, approximately 2,158 incidents (63%) occurred at transit centers and maintenance facilities. The highest number of reported incidents occurred at the Alvarado Transit Center (1,443 of the 3,425 reports, or 42%). This coincides with the ABQ RIDE and APD data that shows the downtown area as a consistent hot spot for safety and security threats. Data for other locations show the Coors/Unser Transit Center with 238 (7%) reported incidents, Uptown Transit Center with 190 incidents (5%), and the Northwest Transit Center with 16 reports (<1%). While the Tramway and Wenonah facility is not technically a transit center, it serves as the east end of the ART lines and experiences a high number of MSD incidents, with 173 (5%) reports over the one year of data reviewed. ABQ RIDE's maintenance facilities/garages (Yale and Ken Sanchez) also had combined reports that accounted for 98 incidents (3%).

The remaining 1,267 incidents (37%) occurred on buses and at bus stops or stations at various locations within the five primary corridors. As was the case with ABQ RIDE and APD data, most of the reports were for bus stops and stations along Central Avenue. The density of incidents also tracks with the ABQ RIDE and APD data and shows hot spots along Central Avenue near Coors Boulevard, the downtown area between San Mateo Boulevard and Wyoming Boulevard, and the area surrounding Tramway and Wenonah. The remaining incidents were spread throughout the other four corridors. Exhibit 3-9 shows the locations of incidents along Central Avenue. Note that the data shown in Exhibit 3-9 is for incidents at stops and stations only and does not include incidents at transit centers or maintenance facilities. If Coors/Unser Transit Center and Alvarado Transit Center are included in the Central Avenue data, densities surrounding these areas are much higher.

3.1.3.2　Incident Types

The incidents reported in the MSD data are similar to those reported by APD and include eight primary categories. Of the 3,425 incidents reported, 853 (25%) were for loitering/trespassing, 721 (21%) involved wellness/medial situations, 606 (18%) involved disorderly conduct, 226 (7%) were for intoxication, 104 (3%) involved narcotics, 78 (2%) were for a suspicious situation, and 70 (2%) involved fights and/or assault. An additional 767 (22%) incidents were categized as "other." A description of these incident types is provided below. Exhibit 3-10 provides a summary of the incident categories and their frequency of occurrence.

Exhibit 3-9. Incidents Reported by MSD at Locations Along Central Avenue (2021 and 2022)


Exhibit 3-10. MSD Incident Types and Frequency of Occurrence

Loitering and Trespassing — This category accounted for 853 (25%) of reported incidents involving an individual or group of individuals who use transit property as a gathering location without the intent of riding the buses or trespass in locations designated for employees only (such as fuel

stations or maintenance facilities). Often these incidents are reported due to the presence of alcohol or because individuals are sleeping at a transit center or stop.

Other Incidents — This catch-all category involved 767 (22%) of situations outside of the scope of other categories that require the response of the MSD. These include incidents such as responses to violations of service animal policies, excessive riding, threats to the public or transit employees, employee injuries, theft and stolen vehicles, and other similar incidents.

Wellness/Medical — These incidents accounted for 721 (21%) of incidents involving a potential health or mental health issue. These can involve health issues such as a heart attack or mental health issue. For mental health issues, the problem is often unknown but often include incidents that occur because of overdrinking or overdosing or are the result of assaults.

Disorderly Conduct — This category included 606 (18%) of reported incidents. Disorderly conduct typically includes a public disturbance by individuals that does not involve physical violence but could provoke violence. This can involve public nudity, aggressive gestures or displays, abusive language, spitting at other individuals, refusing to exit property, and other efforts to disturb the peace.

Intoxicated — A total of 226 (7%) of incidents involved an individual heavily influenced by alcohol or individuals actively consuming alcohol on city property. This can involve individuals completely incapacitated by alcohol who require removal and individuals causing disturbances to civilians around them due to their public intoxication.

Narcotics — Incidents involving narcotics accounted for 104 (3%) of incidents and may include an individual under the influence of narcotic drugs or individuals actively partaking in drug use on city property. This can involve individuals suspected to be under the influence of drugs, those who are incapacitated because of drugs, and individuals causing disturbances to civilians around them due to public drug use. This includes all suspected drug use including marijuana.

Suspicious Situation — This incident category involved 78 (2%) of incidents. These calls can be related to suspected suspicious persons, abandoned vehicles, potential hijacking situations, suspected weapon possessions, potential break-ins, and other activities considered atypical that occur on city property.

Fights and Assaults — This category accounted for 70 (2%) of reported incidents and typically includes fist fights, shoving, kicking, and other types of physical contact between passengers and may also include fighting with weapons.

3.1.4 Albuquerque Community Safety

Data from ACS was obtained for the period from January of 2022 to May of 2024. The data provided included classification (incident type), date of call, time of call, and location (including both the coordinates and address or cross streets). As with the APD and MSD data, not all data occurred on/around transit, so only incidents within 75 feet of priority transit corridor centerlines were reviewed. A total of approximately 8,300 incidents were reported.

Review of the ACS data found that most of their reports involved incidents unrelated to transit. At the time of this report, ACS does not respond to transit incidents because of inadequate staffing levels. For this reason, data from ACS was not used in the evaluation of transit safety and security.

However, as discussed later in this report, ACS serves an important role in reducing incidents associated with behavioral health-related issues.

3.2 Interviews with Transit and Security Employees

Section 3.1 discussed data from incidents reports collected and maintained by the three primary agencies engaged in transit security and safety. To augment this data, interviews were conducted with ABQ RIDE employees and contract security guards to obtain observations from their day-to-day experiences. The groups interviewed included motor coach operators, facility maintenance personnel, dispatch staff, administration, and contract security guards (GardaWorld).

3.2.1 ABQ RIDE

ABQ RIDE is the predominant agency being impacted by transit-related security and safety issues. Incidents occurring within this agency extend beyond bus operators, so interviews were conducted across multiple employee groups. Interviews were conducted with ABQ RIDE administration, bus operators, maintenance crews, and dispatch crews, in addition to contract security guards with GardaWorld. Each group was asked a similar set of questions regarding the types of incidents they experience while performing their jobs for ABQ RIDE.

3.2.1.1 Bus Operators

Interviews were conducted with 17 bus operators who were interviewed in three separate groups. The focus of the discussions with drivers was on the types of incidents they encounter, how they resolve incidents, and their general feeling of safety and security while they perform their duties. The tenure of the drivers interviewed ranged from less than a year to almost 15 years. The interviews included both male and female drivers. The general observations from the interviews with drivers are summarized below:

Types of Safety and Security Threats Encountered

- The security incidents mentioned by drivers primarily involve noncompliance with the Rules to Ride and the passenger code of conduct. The most mentioned noncompliance issues included sleeping on buses; occupying more than one seat; boarding pets that are not service animals; excess personal materials, such as boxes; and bringing weapons onto the bus, many of which are homemade, such as clubs and spears.

- Driver harassment was frequently mentioned. This is usually limited to verbal harassment; physical gestures; and borderline aggressive acts, such as spitting on or throwing objects at drivers. Physical assaults are uncommon but have been experienced by most drivers.

- Exposure to hazardous materials, including fentanyl and fentanyl smoke, byproducts of other drug use (e.g., discarded needles), biohazards associated with open wounds and other extreme hygiene problems, and other hazardous substances were also mentioned. Drivers reported that the incidence of unhygienic conditions increases as the population of unhoused individuals increases.

- Acts involving lewd behavior and indecent exposure were mentioned, including people engaging in sex onboard buses and at bus stops, stations, and transit centers.

- Drivers mentioned activities involving theft as people use the bus as a getaway vehicle after stealing from stores near bus stops. They also mentioned observing riders entering the bus with armfuls of clothing and other stolen goods.

- Distracted driving was mentioned as a safety issue by many drivers. The primary cause mentioned is driving while trying to monitor activities at the back of the bus and while being verbally assaulted by a passenger(s).

Protocols and Actions Taken When Security Incidents Occur

- Most drivers stated that they try to handle incidents themselves rather than ask for support from transit security. Some mentioned that the GardaWorld security can be helpful when they are on board a bus, but some guards avoid riding in known problem areas. Some of the reasons drivers provided for handling incidents themselves are due to a lack of confidence that security forces will arrive in a timely manner and the need to maintain the bus schedule. Drivers stated that they are confident in their ability to handle many incidents, but escalation is a constant threat.

- Drivers use bus radios to communicate with dispatch but sometimes encounter problems with radios. They are not allowed to use personal cell phones and do not have the authority to contact 911 directly.

- Response time from different security agencies is variable and unpredictable. Response time for incidents that pose imminent threat are usually prompt.

- Many drivers stated that they do not report all incidents—only those requiring medical attention or direct security intervention or involving damage to a bus. The substantial number of incidents occurring each day, the time required to complete incident reports, and the sentiment that it will not result in a change were cited as the reasons for not reporting.

Driver Suggestions on How to Improve Security

- Improve communication equipment and protocols to enable drivers to communicate with other drivers on the same route. This would enable drivers to share information about problem riders or activities and would prevent individuals denied access to one bus from using the next bus.

- Consolidate security forces to a single agency to improve accountability and eliminate confusion about who can and will respond to security requests.

- Improve deployment of on-bus security to prioritize coverage in problematic areas and prevent security guards from avoiding problem areas. Also allocate more resources to assist less-experienced drivers.

3.2.1.2 Maintenance Personnel

Interviews with facility maintenance staff were held to better understand security threats encountered while performing routine maintenance; repairs; and the cleaning of bus stops, stations, and transit centers. Thirteen members of the ABQ RIDE maintenance team participated, including managers, supervisors, and field staff. The tenure of team members ranged from under one year to

over 25 years. The general observations from the interviews with maintenance personnel are summarized below:

Types of Safety and Security Threats Encountered

- Verbal and physical assault, aggressive behavior, and intimidation are commonly encountered by maintenance crews. Many of the individuals encountered suffer from mental health issues, are unhoused, or are involved with drugs.

- Encounters with individuals damaging or inappropriately using bus stops, stations, and transit centers are common. Incidents witnessed include intentional damage to transit facilities, using bus stops as overnight shelters, making fires, and leaving large amounts of trash and other debris. Volunteer groups seeking to aid individuals who are unhoused often leave boxes of food, clothing, and blankets at bus stops, resulting in accumulations of trash that must be removed by maintenance staff.

- Maintenance workers often encounter small groups using bus stops, stations, and transit centers to use or sell drugs. When staff ask these individuals to move, the situation can escalate and become violent. Verbal assault on maintenance staff is common and occasionally becomes violent. Some staff have been physically assaulted, and two staff mentioned encounters with people armed with guns.

- Early-morning shifts frequently encounter individuals or small groups who have camped overnight at bus stops, stations, or transit centers. The mental state of these individuals is unknown, and aggressive responses from these individuals are common. Blankets and other debris with embedded drug needles have been left as retaliation. Workers must use caution when removing these items.

- Interview participants noted that the frequency and severity of security incidents has become worse post-COVID and after the implementation of free fares.

Protocols and Actions Taken When Security Incidents Occur

- Most staff avoid interaction with problem individuals because they do not have protection and are often away from their vehicles to access radios to request support.

- For less severe incidents, maintenance staff call their supervisor, who contacts dispatch to request security support.

- For threatening incidents, maintenance staff can call 242-COPS, 911, or MSD.

- Response time across agencies varies but is often too slow to address the immediate need. It is often safer for the maintenance team to move to their next assignment.

Suggestions from Maintenance Personnel to Improve Security

- Increased proactive engagement of potential security threats (e.g., people sleeping at bus stops) by APD or other qualified enforcement.

- Improved recognition of the security threats encountered by maintenance personnel and development of tactics specific to these threats.

- Increased presence of security personnel with greater enforcement authority patrolling bus stops and riding buses.

- Improved ways to dispatch security support and improve response times.

3.2.1.3   ABQ RIDE Dispatch

The interview team met with a group of four dispatchers to discuss their experiences with coordinating security and safety responses for ABQ RIDE. The tenure of the dispatchers interviewed ranged from one to five years. Below is a summary of their comments:

Dispatch Protocols and Challenges

- Communication with bus drivers occurs via bus radio. Some drivers are not proficient in correct radio procedures and prefer cell phones. Use of cell phones is prohibited except in an emergency situation when radio contact is not available. Field supervisors are not equipped with radios and must use cell phones. Using cell phones is problematic because only one line is available at a time, leading to communication delays.

- Calls involving accidents, threats, and/or violence are given priority. However, the severity of an incident cannot always be determined because of poor lines of communication.

- Dispatch can see the locations of buses but are unable to determine the locations of security personnel and supervisors, so they cannot coordinate the closest security personnel with buses requiring support.

- Security cameras at bus stations and transit centers are not monitored in part because of a lack of personnel and not all cameras are functional.

- Written reporting and dispatch protocols are unclear and change.

- Dispatch does not have direct access to APD and is required to use 911 or 242-COPS to request support. This adds to the time between when a driver requests assistance and when support is dispatched.

Suggestions to Improve Efficiency and Security

- Increase training for drivers on the proper use of bus radios.

- Provide dispatch with GPS locators for road supervisors and security personnel to increase the efficiency between security support and drivers.

- Dispatch also handles customer service calls, which can interfere with security dispatch. Move dispatch to the Operations division of ABQ RIDE and separate it from Customer Service.

- Some dispatchers believe there is greater need for dispatcher support. There is often not a supervisor to directly report to or ask questions of, so dispatch must rely on guidance from other agencies and use their best judgment about how to handle situations.

- Protocols for handling a variety of incidents need to be standardized and made easily accessible.

3.2.1.4   ABQ RIDE Administration Staff

Four ABQ RIDE management personnel were asked for their thoughts specific to the adequacy of their current security approach and ideas on how to improve the security program. Input received from this group is summarized below:

Regarding Current ABQ RIDE Security Guards (provided by GardaWorld)

- Security staff is currently operating as "observe" only and does not have the authority or proper security level to act. The lack of authority to detain or issue citations severely limits their effectiveness, and they have a perceived lack of authority by violators.

- The multi-agency approach has resulted in each agency operating independently and with different objectives. This approach creates confusion about what each organization is responsible for and is confusing to ABQ RIDE dispatch and drivers. The multi-agency approach can add to delay in incident response.

- The current security approach is mostly reactive. A more proactive approach would help employees and riders have a better sense of safety and security.

- The APD Transit Security Force is in its pilot stages of development, and refinements are needed to help bus drivers feel confident in obtaining support.

Potential Solutions to Improve Security

- Legislative actions to increase the penalty for crimes against bus drivers and maintenance personnel.

- Repercussions for offenders are weak and do not have an adequate penalty. As such, offenders of bus security rules are rarely detained and are back on the streets quickly.

- Better management and an ABQ RIDE position dedicated to coordinating all transit security providers involved in transit security.

- Increase involvement of behavioral health specialists riding buses and roaming transit facilities.

3.2.1.5   GardaWorld Security Guards

Representatives with GardaWorld, the current contract security force, were included in the interviews. The group consisted of seven individuals, including five security guards and two supervisors. Because they are a provider of security, the questions focused on their experiences with providing security to ABQ RIDE.

Lack of Enforcement Authority and Ability to Address Security Issues

- GardaWorld security officers are Level 1 security guards with the authority to observe and report. They do not have authority to cite or detain violators.

- While riding buses, their focus is on rider behavior and violations of the Rules to Ride. When violations are observed, they remind riders of the Rules to Ride and ask for compliance.

- Security guards follow the preference of drivers with regard to which rules to enforce and how to handle incidents. Some drivers require strict compliance, while others tolerate certain

infractions depending on their severity. This can make it difficult for security personnel to develop a consistent enforcement approach.

- If a situation escalates, they use de-escalation techniques but do not engage in physical altercations. When necessary, they ask drivers to contact dispatch to request support from MSD or APD.

- The lack of protective equipment is of concern to most guards in that they have no way of defending themselves.

Suggestions from Security Guards on How to Improve Security

- It would be helpful for at least some officers to be Level 2 and/or Level 3 security, meaning that high-risk areas could be patrolled by guards with greater enforcement authority and a stronger deterrent effect.

- Communication between officers, drivers, supervisors, and dispatch needs to be improved.

- Rule enforcement needs to be more uniform between buses and between drivers. This includes consistent Rules to Ride signage on board buses and at bus stops.

- Officer training should include more hands-on exercises and scenarios, including training on self-defense without weapons.

- Including an ABQ RIDE logo on GardaWorld uniforms to indicate association with the City could help as a visual deterrent and convey greater authority.

- Other agencies need to be more proactive about controlling violations at bus stops to prevent the behavior from moving onto the bus.

3.3 Public Outreach

In addition to interviewing employees of transit and security, an online public survey was created to obtain input from transit patrons on their use of public transit and areas of primary concern. The public survey was available to the public for five weeks in July and August 2024. The survey included several questions related to transit security, including the types and locations of safety and security issues encountered. Questions for the following topics were included in the survey:

- How frequently they ride the bus.

- Their reasons for using transit.

- The bus routes they ride most frequently.

- The locations where they observe the most problems.

- How often they observe behavior that makes them feel unsafe.

- Types of behavior that make them feel unsafe.

- Suggestions to improve rider safety.

The survey was distributed using several methods, including flyers placed on all ABQ RIDE buses, news media articles broadcast on KUNM, and posts on social media sites used by ABQ RIDE. Posts

were maintained for a five-week period starting in late July through the end of August 2024. A total of 143 surveys were received. The general findings from the survey are discussed below.

3.3.1 How Often Do You Ride the Bus and Why Do You Ride It?

A total of 143 responses were received for this question. As shown in Exhibit 3-11 the most frequent response was several times a week, accounting for 51 of the 143 responses, while daily riders accounted for 47 responses. The remaining responders rode the bus once per week or less. As indicated by Exhibit 3-12, a total of 294 responses were received to the question about why people ride transit. Responders could provide more than one response to the question. Responses varied, but cost savings was the most frequent response, accounting for 81 responses, followed by preference to use transit options, accounting for 61 of the responses. People who are unable to drive or do not have a car available comprised (32%) of responses, with 93 total responses. This suggests that a high percentage of transit users who responded to the survey rely on transit and do not have other options available, which likely makes safety an important issue to them.

Exhibit 3-11. Bus Riding Frequency

Exhibit 3-12. Reasons for Using Public Transit

3.3.2   Most Frequently Used Routes

As shown in Exhibit 3-13, 142 responses were received regarding the most frequently used transit routes. Routes 766, 777, and 66 accounted for 87 of the responses (61%). The remaining responses were distributed among other bus routes, including Coors Boulevard (Route 155), Montgomery Boulevard (Route 5), San Mateo Boulevard (Routes 140 and 141), Wyoming Boulevard (Route 31), and others. This finding indicates that most people who responded to the survey are using the three routes (Route 766, 777, and 66) that coincide with the locations having the most security and safety challenges.

Exhibit 3-13. Frequently Used Transit Routes

3.3.3   Primary Areas of Concern

The 87 responders who listed the Central Avenue corridor (Routes 766, 777, and 66) as their most frequently used route, provided 190 responses regarding the primary areas of concern along this route. As shown in Exhibit 3-14, the routes along Central Avenue listed most often were the Alvarado Transportation Center, between San Mateo Boulevard and Louisiana Boulevard, and between Tingley Drive and Old Town. However, other locations along Central Avenue had multiple responses.

The 16 responders that listed Coors Boulevard (Route 155) as their most frequently used route provided 32 responses for primary areas of concern along Coors Boulevard. Areas of concern were on the segment from Central Avenue north to Montaño Road and the Cottonwood Mall/Northwest Transit Center area.

Exhibit 3-14. Primary Areas of Concern, Routes 766, 777, and 66

Routes 766/777/66 Areas of Most Concern

Area	Value
Uptown	1
Other	4
Eubank Blvd. to Tramway Blvd.	6
East Downtown	8
Nob Hill Area	9
Old Town to 10th St.	12
UNM Area	12
Louisiana Blvd. to Eubank Blvd.	15
Central / Unser Transit Center	18
West Central (Unser Blvd. to the Rio Grande)	21
Tingley Dr. to Old Town	24
San Mateo Blvd. to Louisiana Blvd.	27
Downtown / Alvarado Transit Center	33

3.3.4   Primary Behaviors of Concern

As shown in Exhibit 3-15, most ABQ RIDE users have observed activities that made them uncomfortable. This question received a total of 140 responses, of which approximately 35% of survey participants encounter uncomfortable situations daily or several times each week. Over half (78 respondents, or 56% the survey participants) reported occasionally encountering uncomfortable situations. Taken together, 91% (127 survey participants) have witnessed activities that make them uncomfortable on buses or at transit facilities. About 9% of respondents said they have not observed situations they feel are unsafe.

As shown in Exhibit 3-16, a total of 176 responses were received from survey participants regarding issues of concern, which include a variety of issues that are consistent with the incidents reported in the ABQ RIDE, APD, and MSD databases. As shown in Exhibit 3-16, the issue brought up most was aggressive/harassing behavior (59 responses), followed by mental health- and drug-related issues, with 34 and 33 respondents, respectively.

Exhibit 3-15. Behaviors of Concern

Have You Observed Activities That Make You Uncomfortable?

Exhibit 3-16. Issues of Concern

Issues of Concern

3.4   Summary

As discussed in this chapter, the types, frequency, and magnitude of threats encountered by ABQ RIDE and security providers were identified and quantified using various sources of information, including the review and analysis of databases maintained by security providers, qualitative information from interviews with ABQ RIDE staff, and a public survey. Even though substantial differences were noted in how each agency categorizes safety incidents, the three sources are very similar with regard to the types of safety and security problems facing ABQ RIDE as well as the areas with the highest concentrations of threats.

The common problems that occur most frequently on buses or at bus stops, stations, and transit centers include loitering or suspicious persons, incidents involving wellness and medical issues, disorderly conduct, and drugs and alcohol.

- **Loitering or Suspicious Persons** — While classified as two different incident types, these issues are similar and considered together for this analysis. This category of incidents includes people gathering around a transit facility without the intent to use transit. The databases suggest that this activity is typically associated with use of the transit facilities for shelter or for criminal activity associated with drugs. This incident type accounts for approximately 25% of incidents recorded by MSD and 34% of APD's data. While the act of loitering itself is a minor offense, it is generally tied to more serious offenses. For example, a large portion of suspicious-persons calls investigated by APD reveal incidents involving narcotics, weapons possessions, or other serious incidents. Moreover, loitering and suspicious activities around bus facilities can intimidate transit users and transit employees.

- **Wellness and Medical Incidents** — This incident type is listed frequently in the ABQ RIDE and MSD databases and accounts for 30% of all ABQ RIDE incidents and 21% of all MSD incidents. Similar to loitering and suspicious persons, wellness and medical incidents are often rooted in other factors, such as drug or alcohol use, poor hygiene, or accidents to bystanders caused by physical altercations between others.

- **General Disturbances and Disorderly Conduct** — This category accounts for 10% of all ABQ RIDE incidents, 21% of incidents by MSD, and 9% of incidents recorded by APD. This category typically includes public disturbance by individuals that does not involve physical violence but could provoke violence, such as public nudity, aggressive gestures, abusive language, spitting at other individuals, refusing to exit property, and other efforts of disturbing the peace. These types of behavior disrupt drivers, are intimidating to transit users, and can escalate into more serious offenses.

- **Drugs and Alcohol** — While these incidents were not among the highest levels reported among any group, they were reported consistently among all groups: 2% for ABQ RIDE, 9% for APD, and 9% for MSD. Additionally, as discussed under Section 3.1.2, more than 40% of calls responded to by APD have a narcotic element. Narcotics and alcohol are also common with the other incident categories listed above. This incident category is a threat to transit drivers, transit users, facility maintenance personnel, and the security providers themselves because of the volatility involved.

The data shown by the incident logs, interviews, and public survey are consistent in the types and locations of safety and security threats encountered by staff and transit users. The data show the concentrated locations of greatest threat as well as the times of day when most incidents occur. This information is useful in determining the type of security force needed and the size of force needed for effective deployment.

4. Assessment of Security Strategy and Enforcement Model Options

The previous sections of this report discuss the objective of this long-range plan, provide an overview of the current fixed route transit system, describe the current interdepartmental approach used to provide safety and security, and summarize the quantitative and qualitative data for safety and security challenges that shape the need for security improvements. The next step in the development of this plan included a literature review of best practices and lessons learned from other transit agencies in their approach to transit safety. This effort focused on reviewing journals and other technical articles published by the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), American Public Transportation Association (APTA), and other clearinghouse organizations. One of the reports reviewed included a survey of over 40 local transit agencies. For this reason, less emphasis was put on contacting other local transit agencies as a separate task. The findings of the literature review are summarized below along with a discussion of potential program gaps and different enforcement models that could be used in Albuquerque.

4.1 Literature Review

Articles discussing transit safety and security are published by multiple organizations, Many of the articles are focused on either workplace safety or terrorism. As previously noted, ABQ RIDE has an existing worker safety plan as required by FTA. However, this plan does not address safety and security threats on the transit system. While terrorism involving transit can be an issue for every transit agency, the greatest threats involving terrorism occur in larger cities with extensive commuter rail and subway systems. For these reasons, the literature review focused on transit safety and security for mid-sized cities with transit operations similar to those in Albuquerque. Several articles were found to be relevant to Albuquerque based on the size of the city, structure of the transit system, and potential safety and security risks.

4.1.1 TCRP Report 180: Policing and Security Practices for Small- and Medium-Sized Public Transit Systems[1]

The Transit Cooperative Research Program (TCRP), established under the FTA, is an applied, contract research program that develops near-term, practical solutions to problems facing transit agencies. *TCRP Report 180* identifies current security practices among small- and medium-sized transit agencies and provides recommendations about enforcement models and security countermeasures. In particular, the report covers steps to help prevent, mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from transit security incidents.

This document begins by acknowledging that mid-size transit agencies face fewer major security incidents, including terrorist attacks, than larger agencies such as those in New York City or

---

[1] Transportation Cooperative Research Program (TCRP). 2015. *TCRP Report 180: Policing and Security Practices for Small- and Medium-Sized Public Transit Systems*. Available at https://doi.org/10.17226/22115.

Los Angeles. However, the threat of felony and misdemeanor crime is still present for all transit agencies; perhaps more importantly, perceptions about the safety of public transportation, regardless of the actual crime rate, have a significant impact on ridership. There are several risk factors for crime on public transportation, many of which are inherent to the public, confined nature of transit. One of the most important deterrence measures is having effective security staff. Many smaller transit agencies do not employ a dedicated transit security force and instead rely on partnerships with local law enforcement. However, for agencies with a more significant risk profile, it is typically worth considering the implementation of a dedicated transit security force to ensure that potential threats are being appropriately addressed.

In addition, other countermeasures that do not involve security staff are an important consideration. Since prevention and mitigation are difficult to achieve in a public transit setting, transit agencies should prioritize effective response measures. These can include:

- Onboard emergency alert notification technology (e.g., a panic button the driver can quickly access that will immediately direct them to law enforcement)

- Vehicle location systems (real time GPS tracking so dispatch is always aware of bus locations)

- Durable, shatter-proof materials (e.g., sacrificial ply film on windows to mitigate damage done by acts of vandalism)

Higher levels of patrol and surveillance at transit stops may also be necessary for agencies facing higher numbers of security incidents. A clear, organized, and frequently updated security plan is the best way for an agency to identify its issues, priorities, and security strategies.

4.1.2   TCRP Synthesis 146: Transit Security Preparedness[2]

TCRP Synthesis 146 utilizes survey data and case studies from a variety of transit agencies throughout the United States to provide detailed information about current transit security preparedness measures. The key elements of security preparedness addressed in this synthesis include:

- Policies, plans, and protocols

- Security staffing

---

[2] TCRP. 2020. *TCRP Synthesis 146, Transit Security Preparedness*. Available at https://doi.org/10.17226/25764.

- Technology

- Training

This synthesis begins by outlining the role of different organizations in transit security. In the case of mid-size transit agencies that typically face more everyday crime than terrorist threats, national organizations, including the FTA and APTA, are typically not as involved as local agencies and organizations. Local transit agencies should be responsible for creating security plans that establish priorities, roles, strategies, and technologies to be used as countermeasures against crime.

To collect information about current transit security issues and countermeasures, TCRP surveyed over 40 transit agencies, including several southwestern cities such as the City of Las Cruces Roadrunner Transit, Long Beach Transit, Metropolitan Tulsa Transit Authority, and Topeka Metropolitan Transit Authority. A complete listing of transit agencies surveyed can be found in Appendix B of *TCRP Synthesis 146*. Results of the survey indicated that the most prevalent security issues on transit include:

- Trespassing (e.g., entering transit agency facilities without permission or loitering on buses or at stops after being asked to leave).

- Quality of life concerns (e.g., alcohol consumption, disorderly conduct).

- Homelessness (though homelessness itself is not a crime, many transit agencies have concerns about associated hygiene and sanitation issues that sometimes occur).

Security staffing and training are the first line of defense against these transit security challenges. While many smaller agencies do not have the budget for a dedicated security force, the report suggests effective arrangements can be made with local law enforcement and/or contracted security. *TCRP Synthesis 146* notes that the use of visible and unpredictable deterrence is particularly necessary regardless of the staffing model. Visible deterrence refers to a consistent presence of security personnel, such as guards stationed at transit stops. Unpredictable deterrence may include random deployment of uniformed security staff to hotspot locations. The combination of both visible and unpredictable deterrence is necessary for creating a comprehensive transit security environment.

Consistent training of security personnel, including both discussion-based and drill-based exercises, is also critical to the creation of a cohesive response strategy. Educating the public is another important component of a security plan. Public awareness campaigns can instruct riders to be vigilant about reporting threatening behavior and reinforcing the ways in which transit users can report security issues. Almost 60% of surveyed transit agencies reported implementing either a text line or app to facilitate passenger reporting. Other recommended interventions include video surveillance and Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED). CPTED improves how

transit users feel about their safety while using public transit by improving visibility of transit users with improved lighting and by removing obstructions to clear lines of sight.

4.1.3 TCRP Synthesis 80: Transit Security Update[3]

TCRP Synthesis 80 focuses on counterterrorism and anticrime practices on public transportation. Though there is a stronger emphasis on measures to combat terrorism within this synthesis, it also covers practices that can be helpful in mitigating and responding to everyday crime on board transit.

This synthesis emphasizes that even minor crimes on public transit can create outsized fears in the minds of riders, even when the overall rate of violent crime is decreasing. Though technology can be useful in monitoring and responding to incidents, this document emphasizes that it is no replacement for human security personnel. High-visibility patrols, which involves the unannounced deployment of a group of uniformed officers, can be an effective way to increase the overall perception of safety on transit. Plainclothes officers may also be an asset for routine monitoring of safety conditions on board buses.

This document also covers the importance of CPTED. On transit and at transit stops, it recommends:

- Using bright lighting and interior bus colors to improve visibility on buses
- Removing obstructions to a clear line of sight
- Securing vehicle parts, particularly surrounding the operator
- Using video surveillance
- Installing communication and location services on board the vehicle (e.g., silent alarms that can display distress signals on the exterior of the bus, real-time GPS tracking)

In addition to reiterating the need to appropriately train staff and educate the public, this synthesis also includes information about conflict mitigation. These strategies are particularly useful for vehicle operators when security enforcement is not present. Suggestions include:

- Using non-confrontational language
- Using "verbal judo" techniques to redirect aggressive behavior
- Strategic positioning to reduce the risk of physical violence

---

[3] TCRP. 2009. *TCRP Synthesis 80, Transit Security Update*. Available at https://doi.org/10.17226/23058.

The implementation of these and other strategies can be achieved through appropriate and up-to-date training for transit agency staff.

4.1.4   TransitCenter: Safety for All[4]

TransitCenter is a private organization that focuses on research, outreach, and advocacy to create more equitable and sustainable public transportation systems in the United States. This report, published in 2021, specifically examines transit policing through the lens of equity.

The report acknowledges that diverse perspectives on transit security exist due to demographic differences. Immigrants and communities of color have historically faced over policing in many contexts, including on public transit, and thus may be wary of increased security presence on transit. Women and members of the LGBTQ+ community also experience fear on public transit at high rates, with their concerns centering on threats posed by other riders instead of by security personnel. Striking the balance between over- and under-policing transit is thus a difficult challenge.

Homelessness is also explicitly discussed as another avenue of inequity on public transit. The report notes that public transit presents an attractive shelter alternative due to dangerous, poor conditions on the street and/or limited access to homeless shelters. Though transit agencies' concerns about harboring homeless riders are valid — particularly surrounding issues of hygiene and sanitation — addressing this issue from a policing perspective is not only ineffective, but also contributes to a hostile and inequitable environment on public transit.

In general, TransitCenter does not recommend completely removing police presence from public transportation, particularly when violent crime is involved. However, the report emphasizes that actual policing should be used sparingly, and care should be taken to provide adequate oversight and transparent information about police activity. Other recommendations for improving equity on public transit include:

- Involve the community to identify specific concerns

- Utilize unarmed personnel as much as possible

- Collaborate with local organizations to address issues like homelessness from a compassionate perspective

---

[4] TransitCenter. 2021. *Safety for All*. Available at https://transitcenter.org/publication/safety-for-all/

Though there are many systemic issues that contribute to issues faced on public transit, there are ways to improve safety and the overall experience of riding transit while still centering the community and maintaining empathy.

4.1.5 Literature Review Summary

The literature review summarized above provides an overview of best practices and the range of strategies and tactics that can be implemented by mid-sized transit agencies. In addition, it acknowledges the issue of equity and need for sensitivity in how policing may be perceived by some individuals and groups and the variability in locations and the need to tailor the approach to local conditions.

Of particular interest is the approach being used by ABQ RIDE, which already utilizes many of the best practices identified by the literature. This includes partnering with local law enforcement, using contract security, using panic buttons on buses, adopting clear procedures and rules to guide the program, training in de-escalation techniques, video surveillance, and employing CPTED . However, given the number and type of incidents still occurring on the transit system, additional refinements and actions are still necessary, especially as it pertains to the size of the transit security force, its organization, and its management.

4.2 Program Gaps

The combined security forces and changes to policies and tactics implemented within the last 18 months by ABQ RIDE, APD, and MSD have made significant improvements to transit safety and security. The combined security forces of ABQ Ride contract security and APD's Transit Safety Officers (TSOs) and Police Service Aides (PSAs) include over 75 field personnel dedicated to transit system safety with additional personnel and support provided by MSD and APD sworn officers. On the policy and procedure side, ABQ RIDE has updated key polices specific to the code of conduct for riders and procedures for suspending riders who are serious and repeat offenders. However, substantial gaps remain in the existing safety and security program and bus drivers, facility maintenance personnel, security personnel, and transit users are still at risk. The primary areas requiring attention include: 1) program management organization and structure, 2) the management approach, 3) data collection and analysis, 4) the dispatch approach and internal coordination and communication, and 5) improving morale, trust, and public image.

1. **Program Management Organization and Structure** — As discussed previously in Chapter 2, the current approach used for transit security involves three primary city departments. The collective resources and experience from this interdepartmental approach provide benefits but also creates challenges, adds cost, and reduces efficiency. The multi-department approach also creates management challenges and makes accountability and responsibility more difficult. Notable challenges with this approach include:

   - Shared management across three departments. The program lacks a single point of leadership and management to guide safety for ABQ RIDE and provide accountability and responsibility for its effectiveness.

- Current program management is not dedicated exclusively to transit security with management having other responsibilities that can detract from their focus on transit security.

  → ABQ RIDE leadership is provided by a Deputy Director, who is also assigned many other responsibilities outside of security.

  → APD leadership is by a sworn Commander responsible for multiple programs in APD that do not involve transit. APD recently added a Deputy Commander dedicated to transit and one other non-related APD program.

  → MSD involvement in transit led by their own Chief and Deputy Chief with responsibility for multiple other security programs for a wide range of city facilities.

  → Use of contracted security staff that may or may not involve a long-term relationship detracts from a sense of ownership to providing security for ABQ RIDE. Without some type of dedicated ownership of the security program, it is difficult to have the drive for continuous improvement of system security.

- Interdepartmental agreements are not in place that formally establish budget and staff resource allocation and roles and responsibilities. While informal agreements exist, they are subject to change at any time as personnel are reassigned and changes to the city administration occur. This lack of a memorialized structure makes program planning and execution more challenging.

- The lack of agreements and a unified management structure is further complicated by use of three distinct security forces. The absence of a unified approach makes the development of security goals and assignments more difficult and program progress more difficult to demonstrate and document.

- The absence of a dedicated and agreed upon program lead can create confusion and makes instruction more difficult for ABQ RIDE bus drivers on how security forces are supporting them.

- The budget for transit security is spread across three departments making it difficult to optimize efficiency and plan for program adjustments. A coordinated budgeting approach would enable ABQ RIDE to better plan, develop, and execute the program.

- Hiring of security staff is difficult due to a lack of response from qualified personnel. The factors that contribute to this situation and methods to increase interest should be investigated by human resource personnel.

- Albuquerque Community Safety (ACS) currently has limited resources dedicated to transit safety. However, many of the issues they address are relevant to transit security issues including mental health issues, drug and alcohol use, and homelessness.

2. **Management Approach** — The analysis also identified issues specific to how the security program is managed and coordinated between the three providers on a day-to-day basis.

   - Training of security forces widely differs between each agency. While the programs share common elements, training is mostly focused on general enforcement, de-escalation techniques, incident management, and personal defense. APD currently has an in-depth

training program developed for PSAs and TSOs. The program includes cross training with ABQ RIDE and ACS to improve knowledge of incidents specific to these departments. MSD has its own training academy that is robust, but less so than APD. In contrast, ABQ RIDE relies on training required for Level 1 security guards provided by a contract security force. This training is much less rigorous. Consequently, the effectiveness of each security force varies and reduces the overall program effectiveness.

■ There appears to be an inconsistent approach in the deployment of security forces. While the approach is evolving, it is still somewhat informal and relies on anecdotal information.

■ The absence of shared standard operating procedures for security staff can lead to inconsistencies in how incidents are responded to and handled. As noted previously, bus drivers are inconsistent in how they enforce the Rules to Ride. Inconsistencies in enforcement by both drivers and security personnel make enforcement more difficult and can present a liability for the City.

3. **Data Collection and Analysis** — Each of the departments involved in transit security maintain their own database to record and analyze incidents. A unified database would improve the ability to develop a data driven safety and security program and ensure that consistent data is being collected.

■ The ABQ RIDE and MSD databases are specific to incidents occurring on buses or at bus stops, stations, or transit centers. In contrast, the data fields used by APD and ACS specify an address and do not designate whether an incident occurred on a bus or at a transit facility. Post processing is needed to determine if an incident occurred at or near a transit facility. This requires analysts to expend additional effort to pull and read the field report or speculate transit involvement based on the street address. It is noted though, criminal activities along a transit route impact transit users even if the incident is not on board a bus or transit stop. If the walk route used by transit riders is unsafe, it can discourage use of the transit system.

■ Incident response planning would benefit from a unified database that includes fields for whether the incident occurred on board a bus, or at a bus stop, station, or transit center.

4. **Dispatch Approach and Internal Coordination and Communication** — Like data collection, each of the security providers have their own dispatch system and protocols. This affects incident tracking, slows incident response time, and limits interdepartmental communication.

■ ABQ Ride, APD, and MSD meet at least bi-weekly to discuss problem areas and tactics for enforcement. Meeting participation varies, and communication between departments and management, field staff, drivers, and maintenance can be inconsistent. This problem includes communication up and down the chain of command with problems encountered by drivers and facility maintenance personnel not always effectively communicated to those involved in tactical planning or field enforcement. Likewise, drivers and dispatch are not fully informed of planning and actions advanced by senior members of the security group. A communication structure that defines specific roles, responsibilities, communication protocols, and other management items could improve the safety and security program.

■ Requests for assistance from bus drivers and maintenance staff are routed though ABQ RIDE dispatch. For severe threats, ABQ RIDE dispatch contacts 242-COPS or a 911 operator. In

both cases response is through APD dispatch or MSD dispatch before a transit security officer or sworn office is deployed. The multiple steps involved add to the response time and decrease trust among bus drivers that a timely response will occur.

- APD TSOs communicate directly with APD dispatch when assistance is needed. Transit drivers, maintenance personnel, and/or ABQ RIDE dispatch may not be aware of the request resulting in duplicated efforts and/or inefficiencies.

- Effective involvement and communication between drivers, field maintenance personnel, and security providers is needed. Tactical planning primarily occurs in weekly/bi-weekly meetings involving supervisors and senior staff from ABQ RIDE, MSD, and APD. Actions are then communicated down to transit service providers and transit security staff. Increased direct communication between transit service providers and security staff would lead to a better understanding of threats encountered, more effective tactics, and improved camaraderie and morale.

- The ABQ RIDE radio network has a single channel which limits handling an ongoing security event while still providing support to the rest of the transit system. The need for a multi-channel radio system should be explored to determine what is needed to provide support during security events and the ongoing needs of transit. In addition, ABQ RIDE dispatch must respond to both security incidents and customer service issues. Separating these two tasks should be explored.

- Security cameras are not maintained nor are they used consistently for threat detection and response. Better use of the existing camera system to capture and quantify security events at key locations would assist in developing deployment and staffing plans for security providers.

5. **Morale, Trust, and Public Image** — Transit drivers, field maintenance personnel, and transit users frequently encounter incidents that threaten their safety. Both passive assaults (e.g., needles left in blankets, fentanyl smoking on buses, extreme hygiene issues) and direct physical and/or verbal assaults on buses and at stops and stations are a common occurrence. Incident management and response times are typically not adequate to ensure transit personnel and transit users feel secure. This situation leads to increased turnover of ABQ RIDE employees and reduced use of transit by the public.

- The use of Level 1 contract security personnel and their operating protocol of observe and report has had limited effectiveness in reducing security threats.

- Contact security guards have minimal training, are not adequately equipped, and do not have any type of protective equipment. APD sworn officer assistance is limited to major threats leaving contracted security guards with little fallback support. Offenders recognize these limitations and often disregard directions provided by the contracted security guards. In contrast, TSOs and PSAs have direct lines of communication with sworn officers and are better equipped and trained. While the use of TSOs and PSAs is relatively recent, their equipment and training have proven more effective in obtaining compliance. Because contract security makes up more than half of the overall security force, program efficiency is less than indicated by the size of the force.

- ABQ RIDE drivers and maintenance staff currently feel under supported. This is likely due to the reliance on contract security with limited authority, and poor communication between the different security providers.

- ABQ RIDE has made substantial progress in implementing and communicating new programs (e.g., *See something, Say something* app) with the public. However, the visible presence of qualified security personnel is still limited. Increased visibility and information that builds confidence in transit security is an important element of a transit security plan.

4.3   Enforcement Models

Various enforcement models are applicable to the size of the Albuquerque transit system, needs of ABQ RIDE, and the potential budget available. The identification of enforcement options considered:

- The types, severity, and location of security threats identified by the data review and interviews with staff.

- Information found within the literature search and lessons learned from other cities.

- The collective experience of ABQ RIDE, APD, and MSD from their current and past efforts in providing transit security.

- Anticipated budget available for the program.

Considering the above, several potential enforcement models were identified and discussed with the agencies currently involved in the ABQ RIDE transit security program. The options include:

- **Option 1, Maintain the Existing Approach to Transit Security** — This approach would continue the current approach used by ABQ RIDE in partnership with APD and MSD. While refinements to the approach would continue to be made, they would likely proceed slowly and be the result of trial and error rather than the outcome of a planned program and structure. The gaps and issues discussed in Section 4.2 would continue and could be addressed over time, but some of the gaps identified would not be overcome, including the problems associated with having multiple departments involved without a singular management authority accountable for program success and failures. For these reasons, this approach was not recommended.

- **Option 2, Assign Lead to APD** — This option would shift most responsibilities for transit security to APD and would expand the TSO and PSA program already in place. ABQ RIDE would remain involved but in a diminished capacity. APD would assume lead responsibility for administration, management, enforcement, and data collection.

- **Option 3, Assign Lead to MSD** — This option is like the second option except that MSD would be the lead with some support provided by ABQ RIDE and APD.

- **Option 4, ABQ RIDE Lead** — This option would shift <u>all</u> responsibilities for transit security to ABQ RIDE and would move all security personnel under this department, including TSOs and PSAs currently working with APD. Support provided by MSD would also be absorbed by ABQ RIDE. This option does not include hiring sworn officers, as ABQ RIDE does not have the legal authority to provide police services. Support from sworn officers would be on an as needed basis through ABQ RIDE dispatch. This option would be a major shift from the current operations and would require establishing a new organizational structure within ABQ RIDE, transferring and hiring of additional TSOs and PSAs, development of a training program for security personnel, and development of operating procedures.

After discussing the four options described above, their potential benefits as well as challenges with their implementation, and considering the recent success achieved by the joint efforts of ABQ RIDE, APD, and MSD, a fifth option was developed and recommended for implementation. Each of the first four options have significant flaws and challenges. Removing ABQ RIDE's role in providing and managing security personnel and shifting this role to APD or MSD would benefit from the experience and expertise of these two law enforcement departments. However, diminishing the role of ABQ RIDE in overall management, security planning, and decision-making could shift the operation to one that overly emphasizes enforcement and does not consider the importance of understanding transit planning and services. For example, an enforcement-focused response to problems occurring at a particular bus station could be to remove the bus shelter. While removing the shelter may address the safety issue, it would also have unintended impacts to transit users that rely on this shelter for protection from inclement weather. An enforcement approach that does not fully engage ABQ RIDE could also leave out the individuals at the front of security threats — i.e., bus drivers and facility maintenance personnel.

- **Option 5. Joint ABQ RIDE and APD Leadership** — The fifth option includes leadership provided jointly by ABQ RIDE and APD under a revised management structure, strengthening of the security forces working under APD, and reorganizing the ABQ RIDE dispatch group. It emphasizes the strengths of each agency with ABQ RIDE and APD jointly managing the overall program and working together to develop data-driven procedures and tactics. ABQ RIDE would be responsible for data collection and analysis, providing specific training for transit related issues for drivers, maintenance personnel, and security officers, and coordinating the overall communication approach. APD would be responsible for hiring and training security professionals and working in partnership with ABQ RIDE leadership for deployment. The details of this option are described in the next chapter.

5. Program Recommendations

5.1 Introduction

The recommended transit and safety enforcement strategy provides joint leadership by ABQ RIDE and APD under a revised management structure and increases the type and number of security forces working under APD. This approach emphasizes the strengths of each agency with ABQ RIDE involvement in program management, administration, planning, and decision-making, and engages APD for their legal enforcement authority as well as their expertise in enforcement, tactical planning, and hiring and training of security professionals. The Metro Security Division (MSD) and Albuquerque Community Safety (ACS) would participate in specific aspects of enforcement and monitoring activities but would not participate in program management and administration. The ability of APD to recruit and manage professional security personnel is important to program success and will enable the program to be up and running quickly. The recommended structure is similar to the transit safety and security plan already in operation but includes changes to address the critical gaps that negatively affect efficiency.

The major elements of the program are described in this section and include those listed below. A description is provided for each item, but it is not intended to provide complete details. Once the organizational structure and budget are set, the next step in the development of the final program is to provide and refine the operating details. It is not essential for the details to be fully in place at the onset of the program as it is important that the program has the flexibility to evolve once the structure is in place and additional experience is gained in its implementation.

- Program goals and objectives,
- Organizational structure and roles and responsibilities
- Staffing, equipment, and training
- Budget requirements
- Policies and procedures

5.2 Program Goals and Objectives

The goal of the Transit Safety and Security Program is to provide comprehensive, efficient, and comfortable transit service that is safe, secure, and equitable for its employees, transit users, and security personnel. Riders should be safe to use the transit system, while motor coach operators (MCOs), facility maintenance personnel, and others responsible for providing transit services should be able to perform their duties without fear or threat of physical, mental, or emotional harm. The objectives to achieve this goal include:

- Implementing an efficient management structure to oversee and guide an effective safety and security program.
- Establish an organizational structure and roles and responsibilities that are effective and minimize duplication between participating city departments.

- Prepare a staffing plan that identifies the types, number, and equipment needs of safety and security personnel focused on transit. The staffing plan should include new positions required for management and administration, training, dispatch, and field enforcement.

- Have a budget that is adequate to operate an effective program.

- Assemble the policies and procedures necessary for implementation.

5.3 Organizational Structure and Roles and Responsibilities

The proposed structure places both ABQ RIDE and APD in a shared decision-making role that requires structured and defined roles and responsibilities. ABQ Ride would be responsible for setting goals and objectives, program management, annual reporting to measure program success, and program administration. APD would be responsible for recruiting and training security personnel, managing the security force, and implementing the day-to-day safety and security tactics. The two departments would collaborate to plan and develop the tactics to be implemented using a data-driven approach. Because of the interdependence of each department, it is expected that all the above items would be developed with input from both groups; however, **ultimate decision-making and accountability is with ABQ RIDE**. Exhibit 5-1 summarizes the primary, secondary, and supporting roles of each department.

**Exhibit 5-1. Major Roles and Responsibilities of City Departments for Transit Safety and Security**

Activity	ABQ RIDE	APD	MSD	ACS
Program Management				
Program Management	Lead	Support	No Involvement	No Involvement
Setting Goals and Objectives	Lead	Secondary	No Involvement	No Involvement
Annual Reporting	Lead	Support	Support	Support
Enforcement Activities				
Security Force Management	No Involvement	Lead	MSD Staff only	No Involvement
Recruiting and Hiring	Support	Lead	No Involvement	No Involvement
Tactical Planning	Secondary	Lead	Support	Support
Patrols	No Involvement	Lead	Support	Support
Training (Transit Staff)	Lead	Support	Support	Support
Training (Enforcement Staff)	Support	Lead	MSD force only	Support
Data Collection and Analysis				
Data Collection	Lead	Lead	MSD data only	ACS data only
Data Analysis	Lead	Support	Support	Support
Dispatch				
Security Forces	Lead	Support	Support	Support
Sworn Officer	No Involvement	Lead	No Involvement	No Involvement

5.3.1 Program Management and Organizational Structure

The organizational structure for the transit safety and security program is shown in Exhibit 5-2. ABQ RIDE and APD would each operate in different areas that are synergistic in meeting the overall security needs of ABQ RIDE. **ABQ RIDE** would be responsible for management of the overall transit safety and security program and would be accountable for its effectiveness. **APD** would focus on enforcement activities (see Section 5.3.2). In addition to these two departments, **MSD** would be an

added element of the transit security force but would be limited to patrols of the four transit centers as part of their other city facility patrols. Likewise, **ACS** would continue to assist APD with incidents requiring non-enforcement interventions.

Exhibit 5-2. Organizational Structure of Transit Safety and Security Program

The primary **responsibilities of ABQ RIDE** include:

■ **Program Management** — This role will include the design and implementation of the safety and security program. This Long-Range Transit Security Plan is the first step in fulfilling this role and objective. Managing transit security is currently overseen by an ABQ RIDE Deputy Director with responsibility for multiple programs. A new position — *Transit Safety and Security Manager* — is recommended within ABQ RIDE to take responsibility for this role. This position will be responsible for the day-to-day management of the program including:

→ Coordination with APD's Deputy Commander position to help develop security tactics, identify strategies specific to high crime areas and needs, and assess the effectiveness of ongoing security efforts.

→ Provide management and supervision of other positions within ABQ RIDE associated with safety and security including the data analyst, dispatch group, and the Community Safety

Ambassador (CSA). Oversight of the new Security Training Manager will also be under this position, but supervision of this position will be determined in collaboration with the overall transit training program within ABQ RIDE.

→ Working with and coordinating with the supervisors of the MCO group and facility maintenance group to identify problem areas and the amount of support needed.

→ Development of operating policies and procedures pertaining to transit safety and security.

- **Dispatch Reorganization** — This includes working with ABQ RIDE leadership to determine how the existing dispatch group should be reorganized to best serve the safety and security group. This will include development of revised operating procedures and a related training program to optimize communication and responsiveness to drivers and maintenance personnel. See Section 5.3.3.

- **Incident Reporting** — This includes working with other groups to improve how transit incidents are logged by APD, MSD, and ACS, and internal reports by drivers and maintenance staff. This item is discussed further in Section 5.3.4.

- **Training Coordination** — Coordinate with the ABQ RIDE Training Group to revise training elements specific to transit safety and security. This is expected to include departmental cross-training between APD TSOs, ABQ RIDE MCOs and maintenance personnel.

- **Annual Reporting** — Development of measures of effectiveness and preparation of an annual report for ABQ RIDE leadership that summarize program progress and effectiveness.

- Other responsibilities and activities as determined necessary by ABQ RIDE leadership.

5.3.2 Management of Enforcement

APD will be responsible for developing and managing the enforcement element of the transit safety and security program and collaborating and coordinating with the ABQ RIDE Transit Safety and Security Manager about the day-to-day program needs. This element will be overseen by the existing Commander position and managed by the existing Deputy Commander position. The primary responsibilities of APD specific to transit safety and security would include:

- **Security Force Management** — This includes day-to-day management of the transit security force including:

→ Coordination with ABQ RIDE's Transit Safety and Security Manager to discuss security tactics, identify strategies specific to high crime areas and needs, and assess the effectiveness of ongoing security efforts.

→ Management and supervision of field enforcement personnel including Transit Safety (TS) Sergeants, Transit Safety Officers (TSOs), and Police Service Aides (PSAs) assigned to the transit safety and security program.

→ Recruiting and hiring of enforcement officers and developing a TSO specific training program.

→ Identify ongoing training needs that include special needs associated with transit.

→ Developing and implementing tactical plans in collaboration with ABQ RIDE.

→ Preparing weekly schedules for field staff that are responsive to incident hot spots observed by field enforcement teams, MCOs, and maintenance personnel.

→ Identify opportunities and strategies to have TSOs and PSAs interface directly with transit staff including MCOs, maintenance staff, and dispatch to improve communications and build unity.

- **Data Collection and Analysis** — Work with ABQ RIDE and APD data collection group to revise APD's incident reporting program to enable transit-specific incidents to be identified within the database. This is likely to involve adding one or two fields to the existing system. Share APD database with the ABQ RIDE data analyst for performance monitoring. See Section 5.3.4.

- **Dispatch Reorganization** — Work with ABQ RIDE and APD dispatch to identify ways to improve the ABQ RIDE dispatch to be more responsive and effective (see Section 5.3.3).

5.3.3 Reorganization of ABQ RIDE Dispatch

Several gaps were identified in the current dispatch approach used by ABQ RIDE and multiple steps are required when drivers and maintenance staff require assistance. Addressing these issues require changes to the internal structure of ABQ RIDE dispatch and reporting policies and procedures. The ABQ RIDE Transit Safety and Security Manager will be responsible for developing a revised approach in collaboration with ABQ RIDE leadership and APD. It is anticipated the reorganization will move the group out of Customer Service and into the Transit Security group. Revisions to their operating policies and procedures will also be needed and will be part of the update.

Because the dispatch of security support overlaps with other dispatch operations by APD, MSD, and others, the ABQ RIDE Transit Safety and Security Manager will coordinate this effort with these groups. It is recommended ABQ RIDE IT group be included to support hardware and software needs.

5.3.4 Data Collection and Analysis

As discussed in Section 3.1, accurate reporting and analysis of safety and security incidents involving transit is difficult because of the diverse types of data collected by various city departments. While the data from each group shows similar trends, there is no consistency among city departments on the data collected for transit-related incidents, so it is difficult to extract and challenging to compare. Improvements to this issue are straight-forward. The roles and responsibilities to update data collection and analysis include:

- ABQ RIDE will take lead responsibility for revising the transit database. This will include working with APD, MSD, and ACS, to improve how transit incidents are logged in their databases and working with drivers and maintenance staff to ensure incidents are recorded and logged correctly.

- APD will coordinate with ABQ RIDE and APD's internal data collection group to revise APD's incident reporting program to enable transit-specific incidents to be identified by APD officers within their database. This is likely to involve adding one or two fields to the existing system. In addition, APD and ABQ RIDE will collaborate to determine if a separate database is needed

for use by TSOs and PSAs. This database would be specific to the incidents they encounter at bus stops, stations, transit centers, and onboard buses.

5.4 Staffing, Equipment, and Training

The staff positions, associated department, and number of recommended staff for the transit safety and security program are summarized in Exhibit 5-3. The proposed program includes 86.5 positions. As a point of comparison, the current transit safety program includes approximately 83.5 staff. This number includes 5.5 administration and management personnel, 45 security guards with GardaWorld working under contract to ABQ RIDE, and a combined 33 TS Sergeants, TSOs, and PSAs. MSD staff are not included in either number but are the same number regardless of option. All the positions currently exist, except for three new positions: the ABQ RIDE Safety and Security Manager, the Data Analyst, and CSA. The staffing plan assumes some positions will be reassigned from other existing groups, such as the Security Trainer and dispatch.

Exhibit 5-3. Recommended Positions and Quantities

Position	Department	Quantity
Deputy Commander	APD	1
Safety and Security Manager	ABQ RIDE	1
Transit Safety Sergeant	APD	6
Transit Safety Officer	APD	72
Community Safety Ambassador	ABQ RIDE	1
Senior Security Trainer	ABQ RIDE	0.5
Dispatch	ABQ RIDE	4
Data Analyst	ABQ RIDE	1
	Total Positions:	86.5

The largest group of recommended employees are the TSOs. The number of TSOs included in Exhibit 5-3 is slightly less than the combined number of TS Sergeants, TSOs, PSAs, and contract security guards currently deployed. PSAs are not explicitly listed in Exhibit 5-3 but may make up some of the TSO positions but would be in place of, not in addition to. The use of PSAs has been effective, especially onboard buses where they help drivers enforce the rider code of conduct and communicate with TSOs about developing situations and potential problem areas they have observed. One advantage of PSAs is most have a desire for a career in law enforcement and aspire to become a sworn police officer. This attitude makes them particularly effective in how they approach their role and fulfill their duties.

A brief description of each position within the program is provided below.

- **Deputy Commander** — This position is responsible for the management of the enforcement element of the transit safety and security program. This position within APD currently oversees two programs — Transit Security and Prisoner Transport. For this reason, it is considered a halt-time position within the recommended program.

- **Safety and Security Manager** — This is a new position to oversee the ABQ RIDE part of the transit safety and security program. The role and responsibilities of this position are described 5.3.1.

- **Transit Safety Officer** — TSOs are non-sworn (i.e., not certified law enforcement officers) positions responsible for managing safety and security incidents along transit routes including at transit centers, bus stations and stops, and on buses. They patrol transit routes either by car or by bus. Their engagement can be self-directed in response to observed situations or in response to dispatched requests for support. They are equipped with high resolution safety vests, protective body armor, oleoresin capsicum (OC) spray, Narcan, tourniquets, equipment belts, OC holsters, and radio equipment. They do not have authority to detain, cite, or arrest offenders and rely on support from a sworn police officer when they encounter violent or armed individuals.

  TSOs undergo an 8-week training academy followed by a 4-week training period with a Field Training Officer, 8-hours of training by ABQ RIDE, reality-based training (RBT) that simulates real-life situations, and defensive tactics (DT) training for de-escalation, situation management, and other topics. After they are certified and considered operational, they also receive 40-hours of crisis intervention training for response to individuals with mental health issues, a ride along with a behavioral health specialist with ACS, and ongoing RBT and DT training.

- **Transit Safety Sergeants** — TS Sergeants supervise TSOs and PSAs working on transit assignments. TS Sergeants receive the same training as TSOs plus an additional 40-hour training course for first-line supervisors.

- **Community Safety Ambassador** — The CSA position is a proposed new position within ABQ RIDE to proactively engage with homeless individuals and others needing assistance. This position is intended to organize volunteers operating under the direction of the CSA.

- **Senior Safety and Security Trainer** — This position is new although it could use a trainer already working with ABQ RIDE's training group. The intent of this position is to focus on internal staff, including MCOs and maintenance personnel, as well as to work with TSOs as part of their continuing training after they are operational.

- **Data Analyst** — This is another new position intended to organize, review, and analyze data collected by APD, TSOs, MSD, ACS, and other groups. Data analysis will provide the APD Deputy Commander and ABQ RIDE Transit Safety and Security Manager information to develop tactical strategies, deployment plans, analyze trends, and provide data for the annual performance report.

- **Dispatch** — These are existing positions that will be re-deployed in the revised dispatch group.

5.4.1 TSO Deployment Approach

The number of TSOs shown in Exhibit 5-3 was estimated assuming two shifts operating on weekdays and a single shift operating on weekends, though resources could be staggered throughout the times transit service is operating. The numbers also assume 2-person patrol teams focused on corridors with a history of security incidents. The transit corridors and approach are likely to change as enforcement progresses and deployment plans are developed; however, deployment can be fluid and reassigned as the needs change. For planning and budgeting purposes, the deployment of TSO teams was assumed as shown in Exhibit 5-4.

Exhibit 5-4. Potential Deployment Approach for Staff Determination

Corridor	Teams PER Shift	Total TSOs per Day
West Central Avenue: Unser Blvd. to Downtown	2	8
East Central Avenue: Downtown to Tramway Boulevard	4	16
Coors Boulevard North of Central Avenue.	2	8
Coors Boulevard South of Central	2	8
Montgomery Boulevard/San Mateo Boulevard	2	8
Northeast Quadrant (floating team)	2	8
Westside Quadrant (floating team)	2	8
Southeast Quadrant (floating team)	2	8
Total TSOs Deployed:	36	72

The assumptions shown in Exhibit 5-4 were for budgeting purposes only. An actual deployment plan will be developed based on data. The floating teams will serve to monitor other corridors with known problems such as Eubank Boulevard, Wyoming Boulevard, Lomas Boulevard, Menaul Boulevard, and 4th Street, and late night and weekend shifts. In addition, the floating teams can be deployed to problem areas such as east Central and some north-south streets between Central Avenue and Menaul Boulevard.

5.5 Budget Requirements

The budget requirements for the proposed safety and security program were estimated assuming salaries, overhead, and equipment needs. The base salary for each position was based on information from job postings available online and from information provided by ABQ RIDE and APD. In instances when the specific position was not available, the salary was based on positions with similar grades and responsibilities. A multiplier of 150% was applied to all positions except for those under APD to estimate the fully burdened cost to the City that includes overhead, benefits, and other items that affect actual costs of employment. The multipliers for TS Sergeants and TSOs were assumed to be 158.3% and 162.5%, respectively, due to differences in fringe benefits provided to APD employees and these two positions.

Exhibit 5-5 provides the cost for each labor category and totals. Positions that exist within ABQ RIDE and APD that would exist regardless of the transit safety and security program are not included in the budget calculations. These include the APD Deputy Commander, ABQ RIDE management and administrative costs, and other similar positions.

Exhibit 5-5. Total Labor Cost for Full Implementation of the Transit Safety and Security Program

Position	Number	Base Salary	Salary + Benefits	Total
ABQ RIDE Safety and Security Manager	1	$100,000	$150,000	$150,000
ABQ RIDE Senior Trainer	0.5	$62,000	$93,000	$46,500
Transit Safety Sergeant[1]	6	$48,401	$76,631	$459,786
Transit Safety Officer[2]	72	$41,912	$68,106	$4,903,632
Transit Dispatcher	4	$54,000	$81,000	$324,000
Data Analyst	1	$54,000	$81,000	$81,000
Community Safety Ambassador	1	$41,912	$62,868	$62,868
			Total:	$6,027,786

(1) Fringe benefits for TS Sergeants were assumed as 58.3% of base salary

(2) Fringe benefits for TSOs were assumed to be 62.5% of base salary

The labor cost for the **existing transit safety and security program** was estimated using current staffing levels and the same assumptions for labor multipliers. As noted previously, the current operations include approximately 83.5 staff, as compared to 86.5 with the recommended program. The personnel cost of the **existing operations was estimated at $5,564,500, a value of $463,285 less than the proposed program costs.**

Equipment costs including safety equipment, radios, uniforms, cars, and other related items are a substantial part of the budget as shown in Exhibit 5-6. Most equipment costs are not recurring but are necessary as startup capital costs, though periodic replacement is necessary. The cost for equipment and vehicles were provided by APD and include **$6,000** for radios and **$42,579** for equipped vehicles. Protective equipment for TS Sergeants and TSOs includes uniforms, boots, safety vests, duty belts, radios, safety glasses, body armor, OC spray, and various other miscellaneous items. The cost for a full equipment package is approximately **$8,543** per person.

The equipment costs for the existing program were estimated using the same assumptions and total approximately $601,205. The costs are less than estimated for the recommended program because the security guards under GardaWorld do not have safety equipment. Their costs are limited to uniforms and are covered under the overall contract cost. The difference between the existing equipment costs and recommended equipment costs is approximately $636,706.

The total costs for labor and equipment for the recommended safety and security program are approximately $7.3 million. The existing program labor, contract security, and equipment costs are approximately $6.2 million for a difference of approximately $1.1 million. Exhibit 5-7 provides a summary and comparison of overall costs.

Exhibit 5-6. Equipment Costs for Full Deployment

Position	Number	Safety Equipment	Vehicle	Total
ABQ RIDE Safety and Security Manager	1	Radio	1	$48,580
ABQ RIDE Senior Trainer	0.5	Radio	-	$6,000
Transit Safety Sergeant[1]	6	Full Equip. Pkg.	3	$221,580
Transit Safety Officer[2]	72	Full Equip. Pkg.	8	$955,763
Transit Dispatcher	4	-	-	$0
Transit Data Analyst	1	-	-	$0
Community Safety Ambassador	1	Radio	-	$6,000
			Total:	$1,301,847

Exhibit 5-7. Comparison of Total Costs for Recommended vs. Current Safety and Security Programs

Cost Item	Full Deployment of Recommended Program	Current Program with Existing Staff Levels	Difference
Labor Costs	$6,027,785	$5,564,500	+$463,285
Equipment Cost	$1,237,911	$601,205	+$636,706
Total Cost:	$7,265,696	$6,165,705	+$1,099,991

5.6 Next Steps

This report provides a summary of the existing transit safety and security challenges facing ABQ RIDE and identifies gaps in the existing program. It also identifies a preferred strategy consisting of program goals and objectives, roles and responsibilities, staffing structure and number, and budget needs. After approval by the City Administration and Council, implementation can begin immediately. However, several elements require further action and refinement before optimal efficiency is achieved. These include hiring the essential staff positions, revising/reorganizing the existing ABQ RIDE dispatch group and their operating procedures, and developing and/or updating key operating policies and procedures.

5.6.1 Organizational Structure and Communication

The recommended program relies heavily on cooperation, coordination, and communication between ABQ RIDE and APD, and with input from MSD and ACS. The general roles and responsibilities of each department are discussed in Section 5.3 but require specific details to ensure all parties agree. Providing these details is a critical first step. This can be accomplished with a meeting(s) to discuss the approach and should be documented as part of the overall operating procedures. In addition, interdepartmental agreements should be prepared that memorialize the roles, responsibilities, and commitments. These agreements will help preserve the program when changes in leadership occur.

5.6.2   Filling Essential Positions

Several key positions must be filled to make the recommended program operational. The most critical of these is the Transit Safety and Security Manager. This position will be responsible for establishing ties with APD, MSD, and ACS, organizing the overall program management plan, and overseeing other positions including the data analyst and Security Training Manager. The data analyst position should also be an early hire as it will be responsible for revising data collection and performing data analysis that informs deployment planning. The training manager position is also important but filling this position can lag behind the others while other elements are being developed.

Currently APD employs about 33 TSOs and PSAs, which is less than half of what is needed. The existing contract with GardaWorld adds another ~45 security guard positions. Because of the differences in roles and training and how the new program is structured, ABQ RIDE will need to determine when and how the transition from contract security to TSO positions is managed. It is not essential for the program to be fully staff before it is operational, but it is important for staff recruitment to commence quickly. It is likely to take several months or longer to recruit and train new hires.

5.6.3   Reorganizing ABQ RIDE Dispatch

Effective dispatch is critical to program efficiency. The current ABQ RIDE dispatch approach is cumbersome and contributes to delayed response when requests for support occur. Revising this operation will require collaboration with APD and MSD to further explore problems with the current approach and to identify solutions that are coordinated with the APD and MSD dispatch groups. It will also require support from the ABQ RIDE Information Technology group to determine limits of the existing communication and tracking equipment and help identify options.

5.6.4   Operating Policies and Procedures and Interdepartmental Agreements

The proposed safety and security program will require updates to existing or development of new operating policies and procedures. The program can commence before these items are completed but efficiency will be enhanced with their implementation. Key elements include:

- Mission statement, goals, and objectives

- General operating policies and procedures

- Updated training programs for TSOs, MCOs, and facility maintenance staff

- Updated procedures for reporting and logging incidents

- Reorganization and updated procedures for ABQ RIDE dispatch

5.7   Conclusion

The transit safety and security program described in this plan provides a structure, staffing plan, and budget to implement a cost-effective approach to combat threats that affect transit workers and transit users. While the program cost is approximately $1,000,000 more than currently being expended, more than half of the added costs are for capital and will not be recurring annual costs. The relatively minor increase in cost for safety and security will help ABQ RIDE be more effective in providing transit service that is safe, secure, and equitable for its employees, transit users, and security personnel. Successful implementation will help rebuild trust with transit users and the public, will help increase ridership, and will enable transit staff to perform their duties without fear or threat of physical, mental, or emotional harm.

Appendix A

Safety and Security
Incident Data

Appendix A.1 - ABQ RIDE Data

All Incidents

Month	Count
January	56
February	57
March	64
April	51
May	57
June	74
July	72
August	54
September	35
October	37
November	41
December	31

Incidents by Month, All Routes (2023-24)

Day	Count
Monday	78
Tuesday	82
Wednesday	110
Thursday	110
Friday	106
Saturday	87
Sunday	55

Incidents by Day, All Routes (2023-24)

Hour	Count
5:00 AM	6
6:00 AM	16
7:00 AM	18
8:00 AM	32
9:00 AM	47
10:00 AM	38
11:00 AM	49
12:00 PM	49
1:00 PM	31
2:00 PM	56
3:00 PM	41
4:00 PM	47
5:00 PM	47
6:00 PM	41
7:00 PM	38
8:00 PM	26
9:00 PM	23
10:00 PM	12
11:00 PM	6
12:00 AM	2

Incidents by Hour, All Routes (2023-24)

Incident Type	Count
Wellness/Medical	192
Vandalism	160
Occurrence	79
Disorderly Conduct	62
Fight	47
Assault/Battery	39
Altered Mental Status	15
Driver Action	13
Other	12
Drugs/Alcohol	10

Incident Types, All Routes (2023-24)

Incidents by Route

Route 766/777

Incident Type	Count
Wellness/Medical	46
Vandalism	31
Disorderly Conduct	20
Fight	16
Occurrence	13
Assault/Battery	10
Drugs/Alcohol	5
Altered Mental Status	3
Driver Action	3
Threat	3
Theft	1

Incident Types, Route 766/777 (2023-24)

Time	Count
5 am - 9 am	15
9 am - 1 pm	39
1 pm - 5 pm	44
5 pm - 9 pm	38
9 pm - 12 am	15

Incidents by Hour, Route 766/777 (2023-24)

Day	Count
Monday	19
Tuesday	19
Wednesday	31
Thursday	19
Friday	20
Saturday	32
Sunday	11

Incidents by Day, Route 766/777 (2023-24)

Month	Count
January	17
February	7
March	12
April	15
May	11
June	15
July	15
August	17
September	9
October	14
November	9
December	11

Incidents by Month, Route 766/777 (2023-24)

Route 140/141

Incident Type	Count
Wellness/Medical	10
Vandalism	10
Occurrence	5
Disorderly Conduct	4
Fight	3
Altered Mental Status	2
Threat	1

Incident Types, Route 140/141 (2023-24)

Time	Count
5 am - 9 am	3
9 am - 1 pm	10
1 pm - 5 pm	11
5 pm - 9 pm	8
9 pm - 12 am	1

Incidents by Hour, Route 140/141 (2023-24)

Month	Count
January	8
February	5
March	1
April	1
May	4
June	4
July	7
August	0
September	5
October	2
November	1
December	0

Incidents by Month, Route 140/141 (2023-24)

Day	Count
Monday	5
Tuesday	2
Wednesday	6
Thursday	7
Friday	11
Saturday	2
Sunday	2

Incidents by Day, Route 140/141 (2023-24)

Route 11

Incident Type	Count
Wellness/Medical	13
Vandalism	9
Fight	4
Occurrence	4
Assault/Battery	3
Altered Mental Status	1
Disorderly Conduct	1
Driver Action	1

Incident Types, Route 5 (2023-24)

Time	Count
5 am - 9 am	3
9 am - 1 pm	9
1 pm - 5 pm	8
5 pm - 9 pm	14
9 pm - 12 am	2

Incidents by Hour, Route 5 (2023-24)

Day	Count
Monday	3
Tuesday	5
Wednesday	5
Thursday	6
Friday	5
Saturday	10
Sunday	2

Incidents by Day, Route 5 (2023-24)

Month	Count
January	2
February	3
March	10
April	3
May	3
June	6
July	3
August	2
September	1
October	1
November	1
December	1

Incidents by Month, Route 5 (2023-24)

Route 157

Incident Type	Count
Vandalism	10
Fight	6
Occurrence	6
Wellness/Medical	5
Disorderly Conduct	5
Assault/Battery	1

Incident Types, Route 157 (2023-24)

Time	Count
5 am - 9 am	4
9 am - 1 pm	11
1 pm - 5 pm	7
5 pm - 9 pm	11
9 pm - 12 am	0

Incidents by Hour, Route 157 (2023-24)

Day	Count
Monday	4
Tuesday	3
Wednesday	10
Thursday	7
Friday	4
Saturday	4
Sunday	1

Incidents by Day, Route 157 (2023-24)

Month	Count
January	1
February	3
March	3
April	3
May	2
June	7
July	3
August	2
September	1
October	4
November	1
December	3

Incidents by Month, Route 157 (2023-24)

Route 155

Incident Type	Count
Vandalism	17
Occurrence	5
Wellness/Medical	3
Assault/Battery	3
Disorderly Conduct	2
Altered Mental Status	1
Driver Action	1
Drugs/Alcohol	1
Threat	1

Incident Types, Route 155 (2023-24)

Time	Count
5 am - 9 am	2
9 am - 1 pm	5
1 pm - 5 pm	10
5 pm - 9 pm	10
9 pm - 12 am	5

Incidents by Hour, Route 155 (2023-24)

Day	Count
Monday	6
Tuesday	5
Wednesday	7
Thursday	6
Friday	3
Saturday	3
Sunday	4

Incidents by Day, Route 155 (2023-24)

Month	Count
January	0
February	6
March	3
April	3
May	2
June	3
July	8
August	1
September	2
October	1
November	2
December	3

Incidents by Month, Route 155 (2023-24)

Route 8

Incident Type	Count
Vandalism	3
Wellness/Medical	2
Assault/Battery	2
Altered Mental Status	2
Disorderly Conduct	1
Drugs/Alcohol	1
Threat	1

Incident Types, Route 8 (2023-24)

Time	Count
5 am - 9 am	2
9 am - 1 pm	3
1 pm - 5 pm	4
5 pm - 9 pm	3
9 pm - 12 am	0

Incidents by Hour, Route 8 (2023-24)

Day	Count
Monday	1
Tuesday	3
Wednesday	2
Thursday	2
Friday	1
Saturday	2
Sunday	1

Incidents by Day, Route 8 (2023-24)

Month	Count
January	1
February	0
March	3
April	3
May	0
June	1
July	3
August	0
September	0
October	0
November	0
December	1

Incidents by Month, Route 8 (2023-24)

Comparison by Route

	Route 767/777	Route 66	Route 140/141	Route 11	Route 5	Route 157	Route 155	Route 8
Vandalism	31	40	10	16	9	10	14	3
Wellness/Medical	46	44	10	7	13	5	3	2
Disorderly Conduct	20	12	4	6	1	5	1	1
Fight	16	11	3	5	4	6	0	0
Occurrence	13	9	5	9	4	6	3	0
Assault/Battery	10	7	0	2	3	1	3	2

Altered Mental Status	3	4	2	0	1	0	0	2
Drugs/Alcohol	5	3	0	0	0	0	1	1
Other	7	1	1	0	1	0	0	1

All Incident Types by Route (2023)

Incidents by Time, All Routes

Incidents by Month, All Routes

Legend: Route 767/777, Route 66, Route 140/141, Route 11, Route 5, Route 157, Route 155, Route 8

Incidents by Day, All Routes

Legend: Route 767/777, Route 66, Route 140/141, Route 11, Route 5, Route 157, Route 155, Route 8

Vandalism and Wellness/Medical (2023-24)

Legend: Vandalism, Wellness/Medical

Disorderly Conduct and Fights (2023-24)

Chart showing Disorderly Conduct and Fight counts by route:
- Route 767/777: Disorderly Conduct 20, Fight 16
- Route 66: Disorderly Conduct 12, Fight 11
- Route 140/141: Disorderly Conduct 4, Fight 3
- Route 11: Disorderly Conduct 6, Fight 5
- Route 5: Disorderly Conduct 1, Fight 4
- Route 157: Disorderly Conduct 5, Fight 6
- Route 155: Disorderly Conduct 1
- Route 8: Disorderly Conduct 1

Legend: Disorderly Conduct, Fight

Occurrence and Assault/Battery (2023-24)

Chart showing Occurrence and Assault/Battery counts by route:
- Route 767/777: Occurrence 13, Assault/Battery 10
- Route 66: Occurrence 9, Assault/Battery 7
- Route 140/141: Occurrence 5
- Route 11: Occurrence 9, Assault/Battery 2
- Route 5: Occurrence 4, Assault/Battery 3
- Route 157: Occurrence 6, Assault/Battery 1
- Route 155: Occurrence 3, Assault/Battery 3
- Route 8: Occurrence 2, Assault/Battery 2

Legend: Occurrence, Assault/Battery

Altered Mental Status and Drugs/Alcohol (2023-24)

Legend: ■ Altered Mental Status ■ Drugs/Alcohol

Categories: Route 767/777, Route 66, Route 140/141, Route 11, Route 5, Route 157, Route 155, Route 8

Other (2023-24)

Categories: Route 767/777, Route 66, Route 140/141, Route 11, Route 5, Route 157, Route 155, Route 8

Incident Types, Route 766/777 (2023-24)

Driver Action — Threat — Theft
Altered Mental Status
Drugs/Alcohol
Assault/Battery
Occurrence
Fight
Disorderly Conduct
Vandalism
Wellness/Medical

Incident Types, Route 66 (2023-24)

Altered Mental Status — Drugs/Alcohol — Threat
Driver Action
Assault/Battery
Occurrence
Fight
Disorderly Conduct
Vandalism
Wellness/Medical

Incident Types, Route 140/141 (2023-24)


Incident Types, Route 11 (2023-24)

Incident Types, Route 5 (2023-24)

Incident Types, Route 157 (2023-24)

Incident Types, Route 155 (2023-24)

Incident Types, Route 8 (2023-24)

Appendix A.2 - APD Data

Incident Types

Disposition Outcome	Count
Non-criminal Police Contact	22171
Non-criminal Police Contact	12029
Original Report Written	2438
Original Report Written Arrest	1566
No Officer Dispatched	951
(blank)	941
Officer Cancelled	293
Officer Cancelled	193
Gone on Arrival	26
Be on the Look Out	10
False Alarm	9
Alarm	3
Grand Total	**40630**

Incidents focused on for report

Incident Action	Count
Proactive	1104
Reactive	2900
Grand Total	**4004**

Incident Type (Involving Arrests)	Count
Wanted person	578
Onsite Suspiciou	415
Narcotics	288
Aggr assault/bat	76
Disturbance	59
Other	46
Susp Pers/Vehs	46
Fight inprogress	25
Shoplifting	20
Vandalism	13
Grand Total	**1566**

Incident Type	Count of police reports + arrests
Onsite Suspiciou	1068
Wanted person	678
Aggr assault/bat	562
Narcotics	353
Disturbance	332
Susp Pers/Vehs	287
Vandalism	179
Fight inprogress	92
Behavioral Hlth	62
Shts Frd/Sht Spo	48
Stabbing	47
Armed Rob Indiv	46
Shoplifting	44
Onsite Disturban	36
Sex offense	34
Shooting	32
Shots fired	24
CSP	19
Physical Abuse	17
Child Neglect	15
Panhandlers	13
Sexual Abuse	4
Missing person	4
Bomb Squad Activ	3
Unsheltered Ind.	3
Kid/abduct/hosta	2
Grand Total	**4004**

Incidents Involving Arrest

Legend:
- Wanted person — 37%
- Onsite Suspiciou — 26%
- Narcotics — 18%
- Aggr assault/bat — 5%
- Disturbance — 3%
- Other — 2%
- Susp Pers/Vehs — 1%
- Fight inprogress — 1%
- Shoplifting — 1%
- Vandalism

Incident Type (Written Reports and arrests)	Count
Suspiciou Person or Vehicle	1355
Wanted person	678
Aggr assault/battery/fight	701
Disturbance	368
Narcotics	353
Other	280
Vandalism	179
Robbery/Theft	90
Grand Total	**4004**

Written Reports and Arrests

Legend:
- Suspiciou Person or Vehicle — 34%
- Wanted person — 17%
- Aggr assault/battery/fight — 18%
- Disturbance — 9%
- Narcotics — 9%
- Other — 7%
- Vandalism — 4%
- Robbery/Theft — 2%

Incident Locations

Figure 1: Heat Map of incidents on all Routes

Figure 2: Heat Map of incidents on Central Ave

*Figure 3: Heat Map of incidents on Coors Ave*

Figure 4: Heat Map of incidents on Montgomery Blvd

Figure 5: Heat Map of incidents on San Mateo Blvd

*Figure 6: Heat Map of incidents on Wyoming Blvd*

Appendix A.3 - Metro Security Data

Month (All data 2021 to 2022)	Count
January	894
February	1076
March	1648
April	2302
May	1918
June	2043
July	768
August	713
September	1298
October	1146
November	1086
December	863
Grand Total	**15755**

Location of incident	Count of Call Number
Transit Facility	3254
Bus Stop Call	1384
Bus Call	790
Grand Total	**5428**

Location of incidents (removal of security checks)	Count of Call Number
Transit Facility	1669
Bus Stop Call	1045
Bus Call	711
Grand Total	**3425**

Transit Center and Maintenance Facilities	Count
ATC	1443
CUTC	238
UTC	190
Tramway and Wenonah	173
Yale	56
Daytona	42
Northwest Transit Center	16
	3425

Central Avenue locations	Count
Central/Coors	39
Central/Yucca	9
Central/Atrisco	21
Bio Park	9
Old Town (Rio Grande)	11
Downtown (1st to 8th St)	109
Central/University	30
Nob Hill	25
Central/Washington	13
Central/San Mateo	38
Central/San Pedro	51
Central/Louisiana	62
Central/Texas	32
Central/Wyoming	41
Central/Eubank	13
Tramway and Wenonah	173
	676

Central Avenue locations	Count
Loitering/Trespassing	853
Other	767
Wellness/Medical	721
Disorderly Conduct	606
Intoxicated	226
Narcotics	104
Suspicious Situation	78
Fight/Assault	70
	3425